Common Ownership and Executive Incentives: The Implausibility of Compensation As an Anticompetitive Mechanism

Walker, David I.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3345120

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Thus, even if current shareholders incentivize a manager to enjoy the quiet life, it still may not be in the manager's best interest to do so. Incremental to this concern, Walker (2019) highlights several additional challenges with the Anton et al (2023) framework. First, the Anton et al (2023) model and associated empirical analysis focuses on the executive's wealth to own-firm performance sensitivity (WPS), but Walker (2019) notes that compensation committees have little short-term in-fluence over WPS.…”

Section: Indirect Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Incremental to this concern, Walker (2019) highlights several additional challenges with the Anton et al (2023) framework. First, the Anton et al (2023) model and associated empirical analysis focuses on the executive's wealth to own-firm performance sensitivity (WPS), but Walker (2019) notes that compensation committees have little short-term in-fluence over WPS. Second, compensation committees have much more direct influence over relative performance evaluation (RPE, the extent to which pay packages consider firm performance relative to peers) -but RPE has increased over time, rather than decreased as one would expect if common owners sought to weaken competitive incentives.…”

Section: Indirect Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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2023

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The rapid growth in index funds and significant consolidation in the asset-management industry over the past few decades has led to higher levels of common ownership and increased attention on the topic by academic researchers. A consensus has yet to emerge from the literature regarding the consequences of increased common ownership on firm behavior and market outcomes. Given the potential implications for firms and investors alike, it is perhaps not surprising that policymakers, legal scholars, finance and accounting academics, and practitioners have all taken a keen interest in the subject. This paper provides an overview of the theoretical underpinnings of common ownership and critically reviews the empirical literature. Measurement issues and identification challenges are detailed, and a discussion of plausible causal mechanisms is provided. Across the newest papers employing the most credible identification techniques, there is relatively little evidence that common ownership causes lower competition. However, further research is necessary before broad conclusions can be reached.

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Section: Indirect Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Indirect Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Untitled

2023

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“…The first relates to the competitive effect and the market outcome of common-ownership structures (Brito et al 2018, Rock & Rubinfeld 2018, Patel 2018, Schmalz 2018). The second focuses on large voting power in investments corporations and the impact on the governance and performance of those corporations (Bebchuk & Hirst 2019, Walker 2019, Fisch et al 2019, Morley 2019.…”

Section: Main-paths In Fractional Ownership Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The origin of the sharing economy meets the legacy of fractional ownership

Pasimeni

2021

Journal of Cleaner Production

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The sharing economy is changing the consumption and ownership of goods. As consumption becomes more and more characterised by sharing and access-based consumption, ownership is becoming more concentrated. The literature on the sharing economy focuses almost exclusively on shared consumption practices and rather overlooks the question of ownership despite a substantial body of work on forms of shared ownership, that is, fractional ownership. In this paper, I study the extent of the linking between these two streams of work and whether they have a common conceptual base. I analyse the citations networks of these academic literatures, using the Leiden algorithm of community detection and main-path analysis. I find that the sharing economy literature originated in consumer research that debates over sharing as opposed to possession, and in work on transaction costs. I draw on the strand of work on fractional ownership and identify three sharing economy aspects: psychological ownership, anticommons and exclusion of group cooperation. The findings allow a better understanding of the characteristics of the sharing economy and open avenues for future research on fractional ownership models in the sharing economy.

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Common Ownership and Executive Incentives: The Implausibility of Compensation As an Anticompetitive Mechanism

Cited by 2 publications

References 2 publications

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The origin of the sharing economy meets the legacy of fractional ownership

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