Committee strength in parliamentary democracies: A new index

Zubek, Radosław

doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12426

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Table 1 summarises several factors that are often connected to committees' ability to control the government. Based on this, the formal policing powers are similar (see also longitudinal analyses by Zubek (2020) and L. W. Martin & Vanberg (2020)). However, it should be noted that the dedicated staff in the House of Representatives is a more recent development.…”

Section: Policing Powersmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…There are several comparative studies on formal committee powers across parliamentary democracies (André, Depauw & Martin, 2016;Mickler, 2017;Strøm, 1998;Zubek, 2015Zubek, , 2020 which describe the great range of institutional arrangements across parliaments and investigate the causes of the variation.…”

Section: The Determinants Of Committee Membership In Belgium and The ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although both establish a system of permanent committees, the House of Representatives scores relatively low in comparative analyses of committee strength, e.g. ranking 21st out of 31 in André et al (2016, similar in Mickler, 2017Zubek, 2020). Committees in the Chamber of Representatives are more powerful (ranked 9th in André et al, 2016).…”

Section: The Determinants Of Committee Membership In Belgium and The ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Determinants of Committee Membership in Belgium and the Netherlands

Mickler¹

2021

Politics of the Low Countries

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In this article I analyse whether differences in formal committee structures affect how parliamentary actors organise their work within them. I compare the allocation of members to specialised committees in the Dutch House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer) and the Belgian Chamber of Representatives (Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des Représentants) to test whether committee assignments are given more serious consideration when committees are strong. Despite many similarities, both parliaments differ in their internal institutional arrangements: committees in the Chamber of Representatives are, at least formally, considerably more powerful than those in the Dutch Lower House. The article uses the congressional theories of legislative organisation as heuristic devices to deduce several rationales of the assignment process. The role of parliamentary party groups is highlighted. The results indicate the presence of stable, reoccurring patterns in both parliaments. Even in the House of Representatives, where committees present lower opportunity structures, assignments are given due consideration.

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Section: Policing Powersmentioning

confidence: 83%

Section: The Determinants Of Committee Membership In Belgium and The ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Determinants Of Committee Membership In Belgium and The ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Determinants of Committee Membership in Belgium and the Netherlands

Mickler¹

2021

Politics of the Low Countries

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“…First, the Bundestag is regarded as a 'party group parliament' (Ismayr, 2012), i.e., a parliament with powerful party groups which dominate parliamentary work. Second, it is considered a 'working parliament' with a high degree of issue specialization among the MPs (Steffani, 1979;Lord, 2018) and with the most policy-influential committees in Western Europe (Zubek, 2021). Therefore, Germany is a suitable (and certainly a most-likely) case for an argument based on the nexus between parties and committees.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Division of labour and dissenting voting behaviour of MPs in a ‘working parliament’

Mai

2023

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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In the literature on the determinants of party unity, one pathway has remained largely neglected: division of labour. Given their workload, members of parliament (MPs) are only thoroughly concerned with a subset of policies. We argue that this results in MPs casting fewer dissenting votes on matters within their area of specialization since they have had the opportunity to shape the party line there. Regression analyses using data for the German Bundestag support this hypothesis, including four important refinements: Not only the current but also past membership in the responsible committee reduces an MP’s defection probability. Additionally, this pattern is more pronounced for policy spokespersons and for less consequential, i.e., non-legislative votes as well as for issues less salient to the MP’s party. The results have implications for our understanding of MPs’ legislative behaviour, the functioning of parliaments as institutions and for the relationship between parties, MPs and voters.

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Parliamentary Committees and Ex-post Oversight: Institutional Options and Design

West

2023

Parliamentary Affairs

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Parliamentary oversight of executive power is a parliamentary system concern, considering weaker ex-post institutional oversight mechanisms and actor incentive challenges. Yet, institutional options are precondition for making parliamentary ex-post oversight work and this article investigates which type of options in fact exists within the vital committee system and how they are designed. The expectation is that ex-post oversight options depend on distributional power structures, being stronger for systems with traditions for minority compared to majority governments. For the design, the expectation is an institutional ‘efficient’ outcome in terms of ex-post oversight options being placed in a controlled central oversight committee, and that this applies regardless of government traditions. Empirically, focus is on the five most similar Nordic state parliamentary cases that vary in committee settings and in government traditions. For the investigation focus is on specific ex-post oversight options, the design of these options and overall de-facto use. The findings show a clear difference between the Scandinavian minority cases and the Icelandic and Finnish majority cases. For the design, most cases have ex-post oversight options designed for specific oversight committees, but where the Danish Folketing deviates by providing several options in different committees.

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Committee strength in parliamentary democracies: A new index

Cited by 5 publications

References 14 publications

The Determinants of Committee Membership in Belgium and the Netherlands

The Determinants of Committee Membership in Belgium and the Netherlands

Division of labour and dissenting voting behaviour of MPs in a ‘working parliament’

Parliamentary Committees and Ex-post Oversight: Institutional Options and Design

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