Commission Pricing Strategy on Online Retail Platforms: Power and Dependence in Triad

Chen, Xu; Zheng, Luo; Wang, Xiaojun

doi:10.1109/tem.2019.2957923

Cited by 15 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 31 publications

(31 reference statements)

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“…They find the platform cooperates with both the two types of sellers when the platform attractiveness for the professional sellers is high enough and cooperates only with the professional sellers when the platform attractiveness for the professional sellers is low and the performance requirement of the individual sellers is relatively high. Chen et al (2019) set up the game models for alternative commission pricing strategies among one online platform firm and two competing vendors. They find the exclusive pricing right that the leader vendor tries to secure results in a higher commission fee paid to the online platform.…”

Section: Pricing And/or Investment Decisions With Participant Competi...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Service Investment and Pricing Strategies in E-Commerce Platforms With Seller Competition

Tang

2021

International Journal of Information Systems and Supply Chain Management

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With the development of the two-sided market, many platform enterprises classify their users into different types and cooperate with them with different strategies. The extant literature mainly explores the pricing and investment decisions for the platform, but pays little attention to the classification of sellers when making decisions. This paper investigates the investment of value-added service and pricing strategies for an e-commerce platform with competing sellers. Specifically, this paper considers a two-sided platform that is composed of an e-commerce platform, buyers and sellers. Sellers with high performance requirement and with low performance requirement compete for the buyers in the platform. This paper assumes that each buyer will choose the sellers’ type immediately after entering the platform and buy a unit of product in the platform. Through theoretical analysis the authors show that, the platform will gain more profits by investing in value-added services for type-A sellers and it will obtain the optimal profit when the transaction fee is moderate.

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Section: Pricing And/or Investment Decisions With Participant Competi...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Service Investment and Pricing Strategies in E-Commerce Platforms With Seller Competition

Tang

2021

International Journal of Information Systems and Supply Chain Management

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“…With the increasing popularity of online retailing, the commission-charge mode is widely adopted in recent years (Chen, et al. [4] ). In practice, the commission mode is also used in physical stores, such as Wal-Mart.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Superior Sales Mode for a Two-Echelon Supply Chain of Perishable Products

Bao,

Dai

2024

系统科学与信息学报(英文)

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This paper considers sales mode selection issues for a two-echelon supply chain of perishable products involving a supplier and a retailer. Consumers' purchase desire is assumed to be positive correlation with the freshness of the product. First, the traditional sales mode is examined, in which the supplier and the retailer play a Stackelberg game. We propose a three-layer decision model for this situation, and obtain dynamic pricing strategies and selling cycle length. It is shown that the retailer has little motivation to order many perishable products so as to avoid a long selling cycle length. Second, the commission-charge mode is analyzed, in which the retailer declares its decision first. In this mode, we demonstrate that the perishable product will be on sale during the whole shelf life under a certain condition. The correlation between the sales price of each stage and the remaining shelf-life length is analyzed. Third, the superiority analysis for the two sales modes is conducted. We show the relation between the selling cycle lengths of the two modes. By our analysis, it is shown that both the supplier and the retailer gain more profits when the commission-charge mode is adopted and the commission rate locates in a certain open interval. Finally, a numerical illustration is presented to visualize the discussed models, and some supplements are made for the acquired conclusions by the illustration.

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“…Online shopping has recently started attracting a substantial number of consumers (Chen et al, 2018, 2019; Sana, 2022a). The development of technology and the Internet has propelled the rapid growth of e‐commerce platforms (e‐tailers), such as Taobao.com, JD.com (hereafter, JD), and Amazon.com (Yan et al, 2019; Zhang et al, 2022).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quality differentiation and e‐tailer's choice between reselling and agency selling

Wang

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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Many manufacturers sell products through both the e‐retail and direct channels, which may lead to channel conflicts. To alleviate this, quality differentiation becomes an important marketing strategy for the manufacturer. However, few studies investigate how the form of the e‐tailer's selling contract affects the manufacturer's distribution strategy. Here, we investigate this by establishing a game model in which a manufacturer sells two products with similar functions, but different quality levels, through the direct channel and an e‐tailer. The manufacturer may distribute high‐ and low‐quality products through the direct and e‐tailer channels, respectively, or vice versa. The e‐tailer can choose either the reselling or agency selling contracts. We find that the impact of quality differentiation on equilibria depends on the distribution strategy, contract form, and level of product competition. Under the reselling contract, the manufacturer (he) should distribute high‐quality products directly if the relative efficiency of low‐ to high‐quality products is low. Under the agency selling contract, he should distribute low‐quality products directly if the relative efficiency is moderate. Finally, the e‐tailer (she) should choose the agency selling contract if the production cost is moderate, regardless of the manufacturer's distribution strategy.

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Commission Pricing Strategy on Online Retail Platforms: Power and Dependence in Triad

Cited by 15 publications

References 31 publications

Service Investment and Pricing Strategies in E-Commerce Platforms With Seller Competition

Service Investment and Pricing Strategies in E-Commerce Platforms With Seller Competition

A Superior Sales Mode for a Two-Echelon Supply Chain of Perishable Products

Quality differentiation and e‐tailer's choice between reselling and agency selling

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