Commercial UAV Jamming Possibilities

Simon, Ondrej; Götthans, Tomáš; Popela, Miroslav

doi:10.1109/radioelektronika54537.2022.9764904

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…In [8], the problem of influencing a UAV with a powerful EMP is considered. The use of noise and EMR for jamming UAVs has also been studied [9]. In [10], a software-based Wi-Fi jammer for UAV warfare is proposed.…”

Section: Uav Warfarementioning

confidence: 99%

Description styles of fault-tolerant finite state machines for unmanned aerial vehicles

Salauyou

2024

reks

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The subject matter of this article is finite state machines (FSMs), which are used as control devices in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The goal of this study is to develop description styles for fault-tolerant FSMs in hardware description languages (HDLs) that prevent failures in the state register and in the input vector of the FSM. The tasks to be solved are as follows: development of description methods for FSM transitions from illegal states in case of failure in the state register, as well as for FSM transitions from each state in case of failure in the input vector; determination of FSM output vector values in case of the above failures; development of description styles for fault-tolerant FSMs; and investigation of the efficiency of the proposed description styles for fault-tolerant FSMs. The methods used are: the theory of finite state machines, state encoding methods of FSMs, description styles of FSMs, and Verilog hardware description language. The following results were obtained: two styles of describing fault-tolerant FSMs have been developed, safe0 and safe1, which do not increase the area and do not decrease the performance of FSMs, and in some cases allow the area to be reduced (for some examples by a factor of 4.8) and increase the performance (for some examples by a factor of 2.355). In addition, the description styles of fault-tolerant FSMs neutralize design errors when transitions are described in each state but not for all possible values of input variables. Conclusions. In this paper, the problem of designing fault-tolerant FSMs when the values of bits in the state register or in the input vector of the FSM change because of the negative external impact is described. Different ways of solving the problem at the level of FSM description in HDL are considered. Two description styles for fault-tolerant FSMs are proposed: safe0 and safe1. The fault tolerance of FSMs is provided in the following manner. When the input vector is not defined in the FSM specification for a specific state, the FSM will remain in the initial transition state, i.e. the FSM will not transit to another state. If the code of the illegal state is set in the state register, the FSM will transition to the start state. For all these faults, the safe0 style provides a zero output vector at the FSM output, whereas the safe1 style preserves the value of the previous output vector. A promising direction for future research seems to be the development of new styles and methods of FSM description, aimed at improving the FSM parameters (an area, a performance and a power consumption), as well as improving the reliability and fault tolerance of FSMs.

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Section: Uav Warfarementioning

confidence: 99%

Description styles of fault-tolerant finite state machines for unmanned aerial vehicles

Salauyou

2024

reks

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“…The existing small UAS system designs do not consider the complexity of adversary electromagnetic environments, such as Radio Frequency (RF) interference, electromagnetic interference (EMI), Counter-UAS (C-UAS) electromagnetic attack (EA), and other nearby sources of noises in spectrums. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8] This study aims to determine the feasible approaches that support the "hardening" of the existing S-UAS to counter or mitigate the impacts of HIRF and evaluate such improvements in both laboratory environments and flight tests. The first step is to identify the weak spots of the existing flight vehicles, from the propeller, motors, and controllers, as well as the internal electronics, especially the RF radios and power supplies.…”

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confidence: 99%

RF-hardening of small UAS for mitigation of HIRF impacts

Lau,

Suarez,

Zhang

et al. 2024

Radar Sensor Technology XXVIII

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The survivability of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) in high-intensity electromagnetic environments (HIRF) is a significant characterization that determines the capabilities of UAS in critical operation situations. The existing small UAS system designs do not consider the complexity of adversary electromagnetic environments, such as Radio Frequency (RF) interference, electromagnetic interference (EMI), Counter-UAS (C-UAS) electromagnetic attack (EA), and other nearby sources of noises in spectrums. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8] This study aims to determine the feasible approaches that support the "hardening" of the existing S-UAS to counter or mitigate the impacts of HIRF and evaluate such improvements in both laboratory environments and flight tests. The first step is to identify the weak spots of the existing flight vehicles, from the propeller, motors, and controllers, as well as the internal electronics, especially the RF radios and power supplies. The second step is to emulate the HIRF environment we expect in multiple domains (such as air, sea, or ground airport) in laboratory environments. We are introducing a lab-based emulation testbed with higher power and better configurations than the previous work and installed it for the new emulation experiments. Thirdly, we perform careful power level measurements and calibrations and compare them to the theoretical models. The system setup and size focus on the S-band (near Wi-Fi band) radio links, electronic components, onboard GPS, and navigational sensors. At the same time, the same approach can be easily extended to other frequencies. From this study, we introduced three levels of mitigation measures. (1) Minimal protection. (2) Shielding solution. (3) Shielding and EMI filtering solution. We demonstrated how these levels of mitigation solutions affect the risk levels of survivability in the HIRF environments near high-power radars.

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