Commercial banking in a market‐oriented financial system: Britain between the wars<sup>1</sup>

Ross, Duncan M.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0289.1996.tb00568.x

Cited by 11 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 45 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…18 Recent examination of bank lending during 1880-1914 has 15 Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah, Barclays. The Business of Banking 1690-1996(Cambridge, 2001, 69. 16 Capie andCollins, "Banks, industry, andfinance, 1880-1914 shown that most commercial bank support for industry constituted short-term credits for cash flow and working capital; the mean duration of loans (allowing for renewals of overdrafts) varying from 13-19 months at different sub-periods, while the median duration was only 8-12 months.…”

Section: Bank Mergers and The Restriction Of Industrial Lendingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Jealous Monopolists? British Banks and Responses to the Macmillan Gap during the 1930s

Scott¹,

Newton²

2007

Enterp. soc.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

By the end of World War I successive merger waves had produced an oligopolistic, tightly cartelized, English banking system, which was widely viewed as having restricted lending to small-medium-sized firms—the famous 'Macmillan Gap' in industrial finance. We explore the reasons behind the failure of market entry to bridge this gap. The clearing banks are shown to have acted as 'jealous monopolists', obstructing the activities of the Credit for Industry Ltd (CFI), the only significant firm established to breach the gap (rather than narrow its upper limit). By poaching many clients it had vetted and approved, the banks blocked CFI's growth, deterring further market entry, and thus, preserving their monopoly position.

show abstract

Section: Bank Mergers and The Restriction Of Industrial Lendingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Jealous Monopolists? British Banks and Responses to the Macmillan Gap during the 1930s

Scott¹,

Newton²

2007

Enterp. soc.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…A recurrent theme throughout the twentieth century was that the mighty financial institutions of the City of London adopted an arm's length and short-termist approach to the financing of the British business sector (Foxwell 1917, Carrington and Edwards 1979, Cassis 1990, Ross 1990, 1996Collins 1992, Hutton 1995). Historically, the role of Britain's commercial banks in supplying loans to the business sector has often been assessed within a European context (Cassis 1990, Edwards and Fischer 1996, Collins 1998.…”

Section: Theoretical Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

English commercial banks and business client distress, 1946-63

Baker

Collins

2003

European Review of Economic History

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The article examines the behaviour of two leading English clearing banks, the Midland and Westminster, during periods of financial distress suffered by a sample of business clients during the early postwar decades. Such periods provide valuable insight into the nature of bank-business relationships at that time for, in a sense, bank reaction during periods of financial difficulty for client firms helps define the limits to bank support and commitment to such firms. The article examines the banks' behaviour within the context of a transaction bank model (as opposed to what might be termed a relationship bank model) and the results are compared with those of an earlier study by the authors of pre-First World War bank practice. The results show that the banks did operate many of the control mechanisms associated with transaction banking and that the proficiency of such controls ensured that the banks' interests remained reasonably secure even for the high risk loans under study. Importantly, however, the evidence also shows that the banks did not exercise a stark choice between, on the one hand, supporting clients while relying upon traditional control mechanisms, and, on the other, withdrawing support. In a significant number of cases, the banks were prepared to invest in gathering more information on a client's business, and in trying to influence the direction of that business. This suggests a more informed and interventionist approach by the banks in these cases compared to the findings in the pre-1914 study. For the sample of cases examined, it seems that while much of the behaviour of the two banks remained consistent with the transaction bank model, compared to our pre-1914 findings there was also a greater tendency towards a more flexible, 'hands-on' approach in extremis. In these cases, English bank behaviour European Review of Economic History, 7, 365-388. Printed in the United Kingdom

show abstract

“…16 16 Lazonick, ‘Competition’; idem, ‘Industrial organization’. A survey of the literature is provided by Ross, ‘Commercial banking’, p. 319; Broadberry and Crafts, ‘Britain's productivity gap in the 1930s’, pp. 533–5; and idem, ‘Competition and innovation’, pp.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…110 110 A review of this debate is provided by Ross, ‘Commercial banking’, pp. 316–21, and Newton, ‘Government, the banks and industry’, pp.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Treasury, Britain's postwar reconstruction, and the industrial intervention of the Bank of England, 1921–9¹

Cerretano¹

2009

The Economic History Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

SUMMARYThis article describes how the Trade Facilities Act (TFA) and the liquidation of certain governmentowned assets spurred the industrial intervention of the Bank of England in the 1920s. What emerges is a much greater role of the Treasury in the Bank of England's industrial intervention than has been hitherto suggested. This essay places the theme of the Bank of England's industrial intervention within the broader discussions about Treasury history and Britain's post-war reconstruction, and refines the argument that the original involvement of the Bank of England with industry merely represented an extension of its pre-war operations of branch banking and its duties as a central bank.

show abstract

Commercial banking in a market‐oriented financial system: Britain between the wars¹

Cited by 11 publications

References 45 publications

Jealous Monopolists? British Banks and Responses to the Macmillan Gap during the 1930s

Jealous Monopolists? British Banks and Responses to the Macmillan Gap during the 1930s

English commercial banks and business client distress, 1946-63

The Treasury, Britain's postwar reconstruction, and the industrial intervention of the Bank of England, 1921–9¹

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

Commercial banking in a market‐oriented financial system: Britain between the wars1

Cited by 11 publications

References 45 publications

Jealous Monopolists? British Banks and Responses to the Macmillan Gap during the 1930s

Jealous Monopolists? British Banks and Responses to the Macmillan Gap during the 1930s

English commercial banks and business client distress, 1946-63

The Treasury, Britain's postwar reconstruction, and the industrial intervention of the Bank of England, 1921–91

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

Commercial banking in a market‐oriented financial system: Britain between the wars¹

The Treasury, Britain's postwar reconstruction, and the industrial intervention of the Bank of England, 1921–9¹