Commanding Military Power

Abstract

Commanding Military Power offers a new explanation of why some armed forces are stronger than others. Ryan Grauer advances a 'command structure theory' which combines insights from organization theory, international relations, and security studies literatures to provide a unique perspective on military power. Specifically, armed forces organized to facilitate swift and accurate perception of and response to battlefield developments will cope better with war's inherent uncertainty, use resources effectively, and, quite often, win. Case studies of battles from the Russo-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War and Korean War, based on new archival research, underscore the argument, showing that even smaller and materially weaker militaries can fight effectively against and defeat larger and better endowed adversaries when they are organizationally prepared to manage uncertainty. That organization often matters more than numbers and specific tools of war has crucial implications for both contemporary and future thinking about and efforts to improve martial strength.

Practicing mission command for future battlefield challenges: the case of the Swedish army

“…Indeed, a high degree of coordination is often necessary in order to achieve the desired effects. And since the appropriate balance is determined by the properties of the organization, situational requirements, and context, a critical feature of command is deciding what can be delegated to subordinates and what degree of control to impose on them (Grauer 2016;Flynn and Schrankel 2013;Martin 2017). However, a fundamental principle is that command and orders should not contain more detailed instructions than necessary to perform the task at hand -the ideal should be to always decentralize and delegate decision-making to the extent possible.…”

Rogues, degenerates, and heroes: Disobedience as politics in military organizations

“…Ensuring that militaries obey civilian rulers is the focus of a vast literature on civil-military relations (Avant, 1994;Desch, 1999;Feaver, 1999;Huntington, 1957;Janowitz, 1971). Equally critical, obeying orders is a requirement for the application of effective command and control (Biddle, 2010;Grauer, 2016). Moreover, the interaction of conflict environments with individual agency can lead to shirking (Manekin, 2017).…”