Coming to terms with failed revolutions: historiography in syria, Germany and France

Druze Reincarnation Narratives

“…Whether a distinct Druze political behaviour exists or not is a matter of debate� Two approaches to this question can be identified� The first can be described as orientalist influenced and highlights the importance of the religious practice of taqīya (mostly translated as dissimulation) as an explanation for Druze political behaviour� According to this line of argumentation, exemplified by the work of Haim Blanc (1952), Druze will always back the "strong horse" yet remain loyal to their respective state� The second approach, exemplified by Kais Firro (1992, 1999, argues that taqīya has no special meaning for the Druze� While the exact usage of taqīya among the Druze is beyond the scope of this chapter, it should be emphasised that explaining Druze political behaviour with religious doctrine in general and taqīya in particular is problematic for multiple reasons� Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen points out that: "When dealing with Muslim minorities in the Middle East, the issue of taqīya is often raised to imply that, whatever representatives of these minorities may say, their statements should not be taken fully at face value" (Skovgaard-Petersen n�d�: 9)� Furthermore, if a whole group cannot be trusted, one can ultimately question any individual statement and reinterpret it in a patronising way (Skovgaard-Petersen n�d�: 9, 1998)� 1 The "taqīya approach" also tends to generalise while neglecting the individual factors, which shape each Druze-state relationship� Druze do not live in a vacuum, and while religion and sect often play a role, as individuals they are part of the sociopolitical fabric of the states in which they live and the wider Middle East� Therefore, over the last century, the political activities of Druze individuals have been influenced by diverse wider trends affecting the region, like Arab nationalism, socialism, Syrian nationalism and, in some notable cases, even pan-Islamism� Maria Kastrinou points out that even the designation "the Druze" itself might be problematic since it "overly generalises and homogenises a diverse group" (Kastrinou 2018: 273)� A similar criticism of Druze and non-Druze scholars alike is voiced by Amir Khnifess� In reference to Clifford Geertz, Khnifess highlights the usage of culturalism, an approach which "would equate to all Druze following one political course because all Druze are followers of altawhid ["monotheism" here the Druze] religion" (Khnifess 2015: 31)� Keeping in mind these critical approaches, it is important to remember that the Druze are not a homogeneous bloc, even though this chapter focuses on the main trends of Druze political behaviour� Nevertheless, in my previous comparative work on the Druze in Israel and Lebanon (Lang 2013), I identified two main tendencies of political behaviour: group solidarity in times of crisis and pragmatism and realism towards existing or future balances of power� I am fully aware that readers of this volume might be interested in whether Druze political behaviour is influenced by belief in reincarnation (taqammuṣ), which is undisputedly widespread� Lebanese anthropologist Fuad Khuri went as far as to argue that belief in taqammuṣ was a main reason for the display of solidarity among the Druze (Khuri 2004: 102-105)� 2 Yet, given the justified scepticism regarding explaining the political behaviour of Druze with religious doctrine and due to my perspective as a political scientist, this question has to remain beyond the scope of this chapter� However, this chapter might provide the reader with some valuable context on the political realities in which Druze live and practise their religion� A discussion of those realities, which may shape religious practice and the understanding of taqammuṣ i...…”

Transnationalism and the Syrian Migrant Community: The Case of the 1925 Syrian Revolt

“…Their monographs and memoirs articulated various positions-some emphasizing the uprising's place in the overall Arab cause, others focusing on the revolt as a rural insurrection. 6 Mandate officials and supporters, for their part, depicted the revolt as fanatical and sectarian. As time passed, the historiography of the revolt was revised as nationalist positions shifted.…”