Combining refutations and social norms increases belief change

Abstract

Misinformed beliefs are difficult to change. Refutations that target false claims typically reduce false beliefs, but tend to be only partially effective. In this study, a social norming approach was explored to test whether provision of peer norms could provide an alternative or complementary approach to refutation. Three experiments investigated whether a descriptive norm—by itself or in combination with a refutation—could reduce the endorsement of worldview-congruent claims. Experiment 1 found that using a single point estimate to communicate a norm affected belief but had less impact than a refutation. Experiment 2 used a verbally-presented distribution of four values to communicate a norm, which was largely ineffective. Experiment 3 used a graphically-presented social norm with 25 values, which was found to be as effective at reducing claim belief as a refutation, with the combination of both interventions being most impactful. These results provide a proof of concept that normative information can aid in the debunking of false or equivocal claims, and suggests that theories of misinformation processing should take social factors into account.

Social endorsement influences the continued belief in corrected misinformation.

“…This is consistent with the wider literature on the role of normative influence, in particular the bandwagon heuristic, in information evaluations (Metzger & Flanagin, 2013; Sundar, 2008). These findings serve as a proof-of-concept, and highlight the need to expand models of misinformation belief and continued influence, to more thoroughly consider the role of social factors (also see Ecker, Lewandowsky, et al, 2022; Ecker, Sanderson, et al, 2022; Vlasceanu & Coman, 2022). We note that in Experiment 2, the effect of claim endorsement on misinformation belief reduced to nonsignificant after a delay, suggesting that the role of claim endorsement on long-term beliefs may be limited.…”

Bad social norms rather than bad believers: examining the role of social norms in bad beliefs

“…3 & 4; again, see Legros & Cislaghi, 2020 ; Constantino et al, 2022 for overviews). Some of these insights have already been applied to change bad beliefs (e.g., Ecker et al, 2022 ; Gimpel et al, 2021 ). Whereas it’s beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full account of how SEN-change might happen, let me highlight two points here:…”

Misinformation and the sins of memory: False-belief formation and limits on belief revision.

“…Likewise, a recent meta-analysis suggested that corrections are more successful when the corrected misinformation is worldview-discordant (Walter & Tukachinsky, 2020). On the other hand, findings of ineffective and backfiring corrections have proven difficult to replicate (Ecker et al, 2021; Guess & Coppock, 2020; Wood & Porter, 2019), and accumulating evidence suggests that people by and large adjust their beliefs at least somewhat when confronted with counterevidence, even if the misinformation is worldview-congruent (Aird et al, 2018; Ecker, Sanderson, et al, 2022; Nyhan et al, 2020; Swire, Berinsky, et al, 2017; Weeks, 2015).…”