“Colour Revolutions”: Democratic Breakthrough or Authoritarian Regime Reproduction?

Abstract

L i t e r at u r b e r i c h t Zusammenfassung: Die dominante interpretation der "bunten revolutionen" sieht in ihnen Demokratisierungsschübe in postsozialistischen Ländern, in denen die transformation in den 1990er Jahren zum Stillstand gekommen war. Sie bietet neoinstitutionalistische Deutungen elektoraler revolutionen, modelliert das Zusammenspiel endogener und exogener Faktoren und gibt empfehlungen für die Demokratieförderung. alternativ dazu werden die bunten revolutionen auch als instabilitätskrise und reproduktionsmodus (semi-)autoritärer regime verstanden, womit beiträge zur vergleichenden autoritarismusforschung geleistet werden. Die unterschiedlichen Sichtweisen eröffnen auch unterschiedliche Perspektiven für die postsozialistische regionalforschung. Schlüsselwörter: Wahlen in autoritären regimes · revolutionen · Demokratisierungsforschung · Postsozialismus · DemokratieförderungAbstract: the bulk of the debate on "colour revolutions" interprets them as instances of democratic breakthrough promoting the democratization of postcommunist "laggards". it contributes to democratization studies delivering neoinstitutionalist interpretations of electoral revolutions, models of the interplay between international and domestic factors, and implications for democracy assistance. there is, however, an alternative interpretation of the "colour revolutions" as instances of authoritarian regime instability and reproduction. it provides insights into the dynamics of post-Soviet (semi-)authoritarian regimes which are related to the ongoing debate on comparative authoritarianism. the different perspectives on "colour revolutions" also offer various prospects for postcommunist area studies.

Entrepreneurship in autocratic regimes – how neo-patrimonialism constrains innovation

“…It is more likely that a change of political power -e.g. by a "color revolution" -will reproduce the regime, given the high incentives for the new governing coalition to gain from their new positions (Stykow 2010). The establishment of the rule of law entail high opportunity costs for a new ruling coalition because they would be the first to do without the economic advantages of the former regime.…”

“…Unlike earlier "big bang versus gradualism" controversies in the 1990s, current research takes the institutional stability of non-democratic, pre-capitalist society as a matter of fact. Even "color revolutions" appear to leave the institutional lock-in unaffected, changes of political power at the head of the state notwithstanding (Timm 2010;Hensell 2009;Zimmer 2005;Stykow 2010).…”

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“…However, discontinued transformation processes in the former Soviet Union 1 sound a note of caution as to the scope and extent of regime changes. Most of them ended up in autocratic regimes, for which reason political scientist Stykow (2010) considers "colored revolutions" as a means for the reproduction of political systems that leaves the political and economic institutions untouched in the long run. Reverses to autocratic systems also remain a potential outcome for the Arab countries once the revolutionary 744 WEGNER, HEINRICH-MECHERGUI, AND MECHERGUI momentum wanes and elite groups reestablish a societal order which obstructs pluralism in the polity and free competition in the economy.…”