Colour Constancy: Developing Empirical Tests of Computational Models

Brainard, David H.; Kraft, James; Longere, P.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198505006.003.0010

Cited by 21 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 75 publications

(137 reference statements)

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“…An important line of research starts with consideration of the computational problem that must be solved by any visual system designed to achieve constancy (see Hurlbert, 1998;Maloney, 1999;Brainard, Kraft, & Longère, 2003). This problem is easily cast, at least for a simplified imaging model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does human color constancy incorporate the statistical regularity of natural daylight?

Delahunt

Brainard

2004

Journal of Vision

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The chromaticities of natural daylights cluster around the blackbody locus. We investigated whether the mechanisms that mediate human color constancy embody this statistical regularity of the natural environment, so that constancy is best when the illuminant change is one likely to occur. Observers viewed scenes displayed on a CRT-based stereoscope and adjusted a test patch embedded in the scene until it appeared achromatic. Scenes were rendered using physics-based graphics software (RADIANCE) coupled with custom extensions that ensured colorimetric accuracy. Across conditions, both the simulated illuminant and the simulated reflectance of scene objects were varied. Achromatic settings from paired conditions were used to compute a constancy index (CI) that characterizes the stability of object appearance across the two illuminants of the pair. Constancy indices were measured for four illuminant changes from a Neutral illuminant (CIE D65). Two of these changes (Blue and Yellow) were consistent with the statistics of daylight, whereas two (Green and Red) were not. The results indicate that constancy was least across the Red change, as one would expect for the statistics of natural daylight. Constancy for the Green direction, however, exceeded that for the Yellow illuminant change and was comparable to that for the Blue. This result is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that mechanisms of human constancy incorporate the statistics of daylights. Some possible reasons for the discrepancy are discussed.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does human color constancy incorporate the statistical regularity of natural daylight?

Delahunt

Brainard

2004

Journal of Vision

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“…Unlike temperature, properties like contrast, size, shape, and color will look invariant across many changes in the environment and the subject, such as illumination and viewing distances (Georgeson and Sullivan 1975). Evidence for perceptual constancies is robust, and any adequate account of visual perception must take this evidence into account (Cohen 2015;Brainard et al 2003;Byrne and Hilbert 1997). Since the properties represented in vision are invariant across different conditions of the subject, we have reason to think that they are indexed to the world and not to states of the subject.…”

Section: The Attention-indexing Responsementioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptual content is indexed to attention

Prettyman

2016

Synthese

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Attention seems to raise a problem for pure representationalism, the view that phenomenal content supervenes on representational content. The problem is that shifts of attention sometimes seem to bring about a change in phenomenal content without a change in representational content. I argue that the representationalist can meet this challenge, but that doing so requires a new view of the representational content of perception. On this new view, the representational content of perception is always relative to a way of attending. I call this the attention-indexed view of perceptual content.

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“…In particular, on this view (henceforth, invariantism), colour constancy is an invariance of apparent colour across changes in illumination. Invariantism has become the de facto standard understanding of colour constancy in both philosophical and scientific work on colour; for example, versions of this characterization can be found in many recent textbooks and anthologies on colour and vision (often in glossary entries for 'colour constancy') including ( [Byrne and Hilbert, 1997b], 445), ([Zaidi, 1999], 339), ( [Goldstein, 1999], 567), ( [Stoerig, 1998], 141), and ( [Brainard et al, 2003], 308-309). While these formulations differ slightly in their details, 7 they share the core idea that colour constancy should be regarded as an invariance in our perceptual reaction to members of a pair of stimuli despite differences in the illumination under which each member of the pair is viewed.…”

Section: Constancy As Invariancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…On its face, this task seems to use chromaticity changes to measure the effect of a difference in surround, rather than the effect of a difference in illumination. Fortunately, a number of investigators (led by David Brainard and his colleagues), have begun to measure the effects of illumination differences more directly (see, for example, [Brainard et al, 2003]). In correspondence, Brainard has indicated to me that the patterns of results that I'll be presenting below are sustained in the more direct experiments he employs.…”

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Colour constancy as counterfactual

Cohen

2008

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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In this paper I argue that two standard characterizations of colour constancy are inadequate to the phenomenon. This inadequacy matters, since, I contend, philosophical appeals to colour constancy as a way of motivating illumination-independent conceptions of colour turn crucially on the shortcomings of these characterizations. After critically reviewing the standard characterizations, I provide a novel counterfactualist understanding of colour constancy, argue that it avoids difficulties of its traditional rivals, and defend it from objections. Finally, I show why, on this improved understanding, colour constancy does not have the philosophical consequences that have been claimed for it in the literature.In recent years, vision scientists and philosophers of perception have devoted considerable attention to questions about colour constancy. Among the most important issues surrounding colour constancy are those about how we should understand the phenomenon and those about what the phenomenon shows about the nature of colour. Many writers explicitly link these two sets of questions: they have enlisted certain kinds of answers to the former set as a way of arguing for certain kinds of answers to the latter set. In particular, many have appealed to a certain understanding of the empirical phenomenon as evidence for the view that colours are illumination-independent: viz., many have taken constancy as support for the widely-held position that colours are subject-independent, physical properties of objects.

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Colour Constancy: Developing Empirical Tests of Computational Models

Cited by 21 publications

References 75 publications

Does human color constancy incorporate the statistical regularity of natural daylight?

Does human color constancy incorporate the statistical regularity of natural daylight?

Perceptual content is indexed to attention

Colour constancy as counterfactual

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