Color, Space and Figure in Locke: An Interpretation of the Molyneux Problem

Berchielli, Laura

doi:10.1353/hph.2002.0002

Cited by 37 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…The worry over inconsistency was first posed by Berkeley (NTV) and reiterated by Mackie (1976), Ayers (1991), Bolton (1994), Hatfield (1998), Berchielli (2002), Schumacher (2003), and Bruno and Mandelbaum (2010). If the newly sighted man sees the shapes of objects (even in two rather than three dimensions), Locke really ought to think he would succeed at cross-modal recognition, or so the criticism goes.…”

Section: Worries Of Inconsistency: the Transitivity Of Resemblancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…4.In addition to Ayers, Mackie (1976), Bolton (1994), Hatfield (1998), Berchielli (2002), and Bruno and Mandelbaum (2010) all offer the same reasoning: ‘if the visual and tactile idea of the same square must each resemble the square itself, then they must also resemble each other’ (Berchielli, 48–49f). According to Hatfield: ‘Locke could not, with consistency, argue that the perceiver must learn the connection between identical determinate visual and tactual shapes, because that would have violated his conception that the same determinable, shape, is perceived by both touch and vision’ (987).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5.Lievers (1992) thinks Molyneux’s question primarily concerns our visual ideas of depth, rather than cross-modal recognition. Berchielli (2002) likewise focuses her discussion primarily on visual perception (or the lack thereof) rather than cross-modal recognition. Bolton (1994) believes the newly sighted man fails because he does not immediately receive ideas of shape when seeing for the first time; for Bolton, our simple ideas of shape require judgment.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Is Locke’s answer to Molyneux’s question inconsistent? Cross-modal recognition and the sight–recognition error

Vaughn

2019

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Molyneux’s question asks whether someone born blind, who could distinguish cubes from spheres using his tactile sensation, could recognize those objects if he received his sight. Locke says no: the newly sighted person would fail to point to the cube and call it a cube. Locke never provided a complete explanation for his negative response, and there are concerns of inconsistency with other important aspects of his theory of ideas. These charges of inconsistency rest upon an unrecognized and unfounded assumption that seeing entails recognition. Locke’s negative answer to Molyneux’s question is consistent with his other philosophical commitments.

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Section: Worries Of Inconsistency: the Transitivity Of Resemblancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Is Locke’s answer to Molyneux’s question inconsistent? Cross-modal recognition and the sight–recognition error

Vaughn

2019

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…See Berchielli (); for criticism, see Schumacher (), Bruno and Mandelbaum (, p. 169 f.), and Jacovides (, p. 135).…”

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confidence: 99%

Locke on the role of judgment in perception

Ott

2019

European J of Philosophy

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How much is given in perceptual experience, and how much must be constructed? John Locke's answer to this question contains two prima facie incompatible strands. On the one hand, he claims that ideas of primary qualities come to us passively, through multiple senses: the idea of a sphere can be received either by sight or touch. On the other hand, Locke seemingly thinks that a faculty he calls "judgment" is needed to create visual ideas of threedimensional shapes. How can these accounts be made consistent? The problem comes to a head in the discussion of Molyneux's problem: can a person born blind and then made to see identify a sphere and a cube, when he had only touched them in the past? Locke's answer is no, but, as George Berkeley points out, it is hard to see why: if the ideas of shapes come to us through sight as well as touch, nothing should stop Molyneux man from instantly recognizing sphere and cube. Pace much of the existing literature, I argue that although Locke does think we receive visual ideas of primary qualities, the faculty of judgment is required to "inflate" those ideas into three dimensions and to correct for other perspectival distortions. I then show how this answer is consistent with the rest of his theory of perception. 1 | INTRODUCTION The opening eight chapters of Book II of the Essay concerning Human Understanding suggest a simple picture of sensory experience. On this view, the mind passively awaits the given of experience: ideas of primary and secondary qualities. Unlike an idea of a color, an idea of a primary quality such as shape comes to us through multiple senses. The ninth chapter threatens this simple picture. There, Locke tells us that some visual ideas of primary qualities are

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“…3 3 Here I adopt the standard reading of the passage as advanced by Menno Lievers (407–10) and others. Recent papers by Martha Bolton (1994) and Laura Berchielli (2002) have offered alternatives to the standard reading. I criticize these alternative readings in my forthcoming ‘Locke on Perception.’ …”

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confidence: 99%

Locke and the Visual Array

Jacovides

2011

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Color, Space and Figure in Locke: An Interpretation of the Molyneux Problem

Cited by 37 publications

References 4 publications

Is Locke’s answer to Molyneux’s question inconsistent? Cross-modal recognition and the sight–recognition error

Is Locke’s answer to Molyneux’s question inconsistent? Cross-modal recognition and the sight–recognition error

Locke on the role of judgment in perception

Locke and the Visual Array

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