Color memory matching: Time effect and other factors

Pérez-Carpinell, J.; Baldoví, R.; Sáiz, Dolores de Fez; Castro, José

doi:10.1002/(sici)1520-6378(199808)23:4<234::aid-col8>3.0.co;2-p

Cited by 83 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…In colour-discrimination tasks, males were found to have a broader range of poorer discrimination in the middle of the spectrum (530-570 nm) compared to females (Abramov, Gordon, Feldman and Chavarga, 2012). In colour-matching tasks, females were found to have superior abilities relative to males, in particular with regards to hue and saturation (Pérez-Carpinell, Baldovi, de Fez and Castro, 1998). In judging suprathreshold colour differences, women were shown to place more weight on inter-stimulus separation along a red-green axis while males place more weight along a lightness axis (Bimler, Kirkland and Jameson, 2004).…”

Section: Introduction: Gender Differences In Colour Vocabulary Colousupporting

confidence: 64%

Gender differences in colour naming

2014

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Gender differences in colour naming were explored using a web-based experiment in English. Each participant named 20 colours selected from 600Munsell samples, presented one at a time against a neutral background.Colour names and typing onset response times were registered. For the eleven basic colour terms, elicitation frequency was comparable for both genders. Females demonstrated though more elaborated colour vocabulary, with more descriptors in general and more non-basic monolexemic terms; they also named colours faster than males. The two genders differ in the repertoire of frequent colour terms: a Bayesian synthetic observer revealed that women segment colour space linguistically more densely in the "warm" area whereas men do so in the 'cool' area. Current "nurture" and "nature" explanations of why females excel in colour naming behaviour are considered.

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Section: Introduction: Gender Differences In Colour Vocabulary Colousupporting

confidence: 64%

Gender differences in colour naming

2014

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“…Other studies have shown that women perform better than men at matching memory colours (Perez-Carpinell et al, 1998). Differences in colour preferences between males and females have also been demonstrated (Saito, 1994;Saito, 1996;Saito, 1999;Hurlbert & Ling, 2007); as have differences in unique-hue judgments for yellow and red (Kuehni, 2001).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 91%

Sex-related differences in chromatic sensitivity

et al. 2008

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This is the unspecified version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link AbstractGenerally women are believed to be more discriminating than men in the use of colour names and this is often taken to imply superior colour vision. However, if both Xchromosome linked colour deficient males (~8%) and females (<1%) as well as heterozygote female carriers (~15%) are excluded from comparisons, then differences between men and women in red-green colour discrimination have been reported as not being significant (e.g., Pickford, 1944;Hood et al., 2006). We re-examined this question by assessing the performance of 150 males and 150 females on the Colour Assessment and Diagnosis (CAD)test (Rodriguez-Carmona, 2005). This is a sensitive test that yields small colour detection thresholds. The test employs direction-specific, moving, chromatic stimuli embedded in a background of random, dynamic, luminance contrast noise. A four-alternative, forced-choice

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“…We are consciously aware of shades of colour in more finely differentiated ways when we have two or more very close shades to compare at one time than when those shades are presented in succession [66,67]. This also holds for conscious discrimination of auditory pitch [68].…”

Section: Higher-order Misrepresentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function

Rosenthal

2012

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological states, they have little more in common. One thing they do share is the possibility of misrepresentation; just as metacognitive processing can misrepresent one's cognitive states and abilities, so the HOA in virtue of which one's mental states are conscious can, and sometimes does, misdescribe those states. A striking difference between the two, however, has to do with utility for psychological processing. Metacognition has considerable benefit for psychological processing; in contrast, it is unlikely that there is much, if any, utility to mental states' being conscious over and above the utility those states have when they are not conscious.

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Color memory matching: Time effect and other factors

Cited by 83 publications

References 5 publications

Gender differences in colour naming

Gender differences in colour naming

Sex-related differences in chromatic sensitivity

Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function

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