Collusion in Hierarchical Agency

Kofman, Fred; Lawarrée, Jacques

doi:10.2307/2951721

Cited by 347 publications

(184 citation statements)

References 13 publications

(16 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

167

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…[12] There are two typical audit systems, internal and external audit systems. [13] In the internal audit system, internal auditors belong to the same organization as auditees and possess abundant information on the activity of the auditees, which is not limited to the scope of auditing. Since they can provide both auditing and non-auditing services, the opportunity cost of the auditing function is low.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Medical record review for faculty promotion: A cohort analysis

Huang

Jenq

et al. 2015

Biomed J

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Background: A medical record is an important source of information regarding medical care and medical record review plays an important role in the evaluation of the teaching proficiency. The study analyzed the difference between internal and external auditing when conducting medical record review for faculty promotion in a study institute. Methods:We analyzed the scores related to the medical records maintained by applicants for the faculty promotion of attending physicians during the period between 2008 and 2010 at the Chang Gung Memorial Hospital. The scores were obtained from one internal reviewer of the study institute and two external reviewers from other medical centers, and routine scores were obtained from the Committee of Medical Record 1 year before application. Pearson's correlation coefficient was used to analyze the correlation and statistical significance. Results:There were 259 applicants for faculty promotion enrolled in this study [professors (n = 33, 13%), associate professors (n = 63, 24%), assistant professors (n = 90, 35%), lecturers (n = 73, 28%)]. The scores of the external reviewers 1 and 2 were correlated with routine scores (r = 0.187, p = 0.002; r = 0.198, p = 0.001; N= 259), respectively. The correlation between external reviewers' average and ordinary scores was significant for assistant professor (r = 0.334, p = 0.001, n = 90) and professor grades (r = 0.469, p = 0.006, n = 33). However, the internal reviewer scores did not correlate with the routine scores (r = 0.073, p = 0.241, N = 259). Conclusions: The scores from external reviewers correlated more with routine scores than the scores from internal reviewers, suggesting that utilizing an external auditing system of medical records for the faculty promotion of attending physicians is quite feasible and balanced. (Biomed J 2015;38:456-461)

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Medical record review for faculty promotion: A cohort analysis

Huang

Jenq

et al. 2015

Biomed J

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Surprisingly, however, the literature on imperfect auditing is small (Lawarree and Van Audenrode 1992;Kofman and Lawarree 1993;Bardsley 1996;and, implicitly, Erard and Feinstein 1994). The closest to my approach is Bardsley (1996), who has a similar model of imperfect auditing.…”

Section: A Model Of Imperfect Auditingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit Quotas

Fryer¹

2009

The Journal of Legal Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Employment or admission "goals" are often preferred to affirmative action as a way of obtaining diversity. By constructing a simple model of employer-auditor interaction, I show that when an auditor has imperfect information regarding employers' proclivities to discriminate and the fraction of qualified minorities in each employer's applicant pool, goals are synonymous with quotas. Technically speaking, any equilibrium of the auditing game involves a nonempty set of employers who hire so that they do not trigger an audit by rejecting qualified nonminorities, hiring unqualified minorities, or both. Further, under some assumptions, explicit quotas (those mandated by an auditor) are more efficient than implicit quotas (goals settled on in equilibrium by employers wishing to avoid an audit).Since President Nixon was here in my job, America has used goals and timetables to preserve opportunity and to prevent discrimination, to urge businesses to set higher expectations for themselves and to realize those expectations. But we did not and we will not use rigid quotas to mandate outcomes.

show abstract

“…The possibility that auditors themselves are subject to opportunist behavior has been extensively acknowledged (see for example Tirole, 1986Tirole, , 1992and Kofman and Lawarée, 1996). However, the main focus of this literature remains the possibility of collusion between the agent and the auditor, rather than the incentive problem that arises if auditing effort is unobservable.…”

Section: Links To the Literature • Auditingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auditing and Property Rights

Iossa¹,

Legros²

2004

The RAND Journal of Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In a regulatory setting, audit provides incentives to an agent whose actions affect the future value of an asset. The principal does not observe the audit intensity nor the audit outcome and audit generates soft information. We show that with interim participation constraints, the principal may strictly prefer not to use the information of the agent but to rely only on the information given by the auditor. When this occurs, the auditor obtains property rights on the asset when he reports that the future value of the asset is high, while the agent is compensated by a monetary payment.

show abstract

Collusion in Hierarchical Agency

Cited by 347 publications

References 13 publications

Medical record review for faculty promotion: A cohort analysis

Medical record review for faculty promotion: A cohort analysis

Implicit Quotas

Auditing and Property Rights

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About