Collusion in Bertrand vs. Cournot Competition: A Virtual Bargaining Approach

Melkonyan, Tigran A.; Zeitoun, Hossam; Chater, Nick

doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2878

Cited by 23 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…[21] analyze the impact of exclusive territories on manufacturers' incentives to sustain tacit collusion between competing supply chains. Melkonyan et al [22] develop a formal account of virtual bargaining and demonstrate that it leads to collusion in Bertrand, but not in Cournot, competition. Zheng et al [23] establish an infinitely repeated game to examine the interaction between the manufacturer's channel strategy and the downstream retailers' collusion behavior.…”

Section: Collusion In Economics and Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Restrain Price Collusion in Trade-Based Supply Chain Finance

et al. 2021

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Collusion can increase the transaction value among supply chain members to obtain higher loans from supply chain finance (SCF) service provider, which will bring some serious risks for SCF. However, it is difficult to be identified and restrain the SCF service provider due to its stability and hiddenness. Different SCF transaction structures will affect the profits of supply chain members from collusion. This paper develops various game models for collusion and not collusion for different SCF transaction structures and investigates the impact of SCF transaction structures on the boundary conditions of collusion. Through comparative analysis, the findings of models are as follows: (1) in a two-echelon supply chain, the supplier and retailer are more likely to conduct collusion under the sequential game than under the simultaneous game; (2) collusion in the two-echelon supply chain can obtain higher loans than that in the three-echelon supply chain, so it has more serious hidden danger; (3) in the two-echelon supply chain, collusion is easier to form than in the three-echelon SCF supply chain that has spontaneous endogenous constraints. We also develop two types of mechanisms to restrain collusion behavior from profit sharing and incomplete information perspectives. Finally, we summarize the theoretical implications and analyze the management implications through a case study.

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Section: Collusion In Economics and Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Restrain Price Collusion in Trade-Based Supply Chain Finance

et al. 2021

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“…Feng et al analyzed a dynamic bargaining game in which a seller and a buyer negotiate quantities and payment in the trade for a product, the buyer has private information about his type (high or low) [37]- [38]. Melkonyan et al conducted an experiment in which a retailer and a supplier either interact through ultimatum offers or dynamically bargain over contract terms, including a wholesale price and, potentially, an order quantity [39]. Hsu et al studied leader-based collective bargaining, under which a leading buyer and a following buyer form an alliance to jointly purchase a common component from a supplier [40].…”

Section: Considered a Make-to-stock Production-inventory Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing Supply Disruption by Horizontal Cooperation

Zheng

Zhang

2021

IEEE Access

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“…e result showed that the latter had better performance. Melkonyan et al [13] applied virtual bargaining in competitive interactions to illustrate that it caused collusion in Bertrand instead of Cournot. Most of the above studies focused on a single period to make optimal decision.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Complex Dynamics in Different Bargaining Systems

Bao

2020

Complexity

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This paper focuses on the bargaining behavior of supply chain members and studies the stability of the bargaining system. There are two forms of bargaining in the process of negotiation. One is separate bargaining, and the other is that the automobile manufacturers form an alliance and bargain with the supplier collectively. We explore the influence of bargaining power and adjustment speed on the stability of the dynamic system and find that both of the factors need to be small to maintain the stability of the supply chain. After comparing the two forms of bargaining in terms of profits and stable regions, we find that the collective bargaining is a pattern with the existence of risk and benefit simultaneously. In order to control chaos in collective bargaining to lower the risk, we adopt the delay feedback control method. With the introduction of the control factor, the system tends to be stable finally.

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Collusion in Bertrand vs. Cournot Competition: A Virtual Bargaining Approach

Cited by 23 publications

References 35 publications

Restrain Price Collusion in Trade-Based Supply Chain Finance

Restrain Price Collusion in Trade-Based Supply Chain Finance

Managing Supply Disruption by Horizontal Cooperation

Analysis of Complex Dynamics in Different Bargaining Systems

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