Collusion and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Coe, Andrew J.; Vaynman, Jane

doi:10.1086/682080

Cited by 65 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Germany and Japan, the only plausible potential attackers of the US program, Coe and Vaynman (2015);Miller (2014); Rabinowitz and Miller (2015). 31 Burr and Richelson (2001).…”

Section: H2: Preventive Attacks Associated With Near-success Estimatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War

Bas¹,

Coe²

2016

Int Org

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We develop a formal model of bargaining between two states, where one can invest in a program to develop nuclear weapons and the other imperfectly observes its efforts and progress over time. In the absence of a nonproliferation deal, the observing state watches the former's program, waiting until proliferation seems imminent to attack. Chance elements-when the program will make progress and when the other state will discover this-determine outcomes. Surprise proliferation, crises over the suspected progress of a nuclear program, and possibly "mistaken" preventive wars arise endogenously from these chance elements. Consistent with the model's predictions and contrary to previous studies, the empirical evidence shows that the progress of a nuclear program and intelligence estimates of it explain the character and outcomes of most interactions between a proliferant and a potential preventive attacker. Counterintuitively, policies intended to reduce proliferation by delaying nuclear programs or improving monitoring capabilities may instead encourage it.

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“…Germany and Japan, the only plausible potential attackers of the US program, Coe and Vaynman (2015);Miller (2014); Rabinowitz and Miller (2015). 31 Burr and Richelson (2001).…”

Section: H2: Preventive Attacks Associated With Near-success Estimatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War

Bas¹,

Coe²

2016

Int Org

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“…Such a non-threatened state might fear that regional instability in the proliferator's neighbourhood or a nuclear exchange might have global repercussions. 66 However, withdrawing from the NPT or sabotaging the agreement would surely not put these concerns to rest.…”

Section: The Perils Of Reactive Proliferationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse

Horovitz

2014

Journal of Strategic Studies

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This article questions the predominantly pessimistic assessments over the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). After analysing available evidence on states' interests and interactions within the NPT's framework, it argues that several negative expectations are unwarranted. Conversely, the article identifies three potentially threatening scenarios. Therefore, it scrutinizes the likely impact of reactive nuclear proliferation; analyses the probability of significant actors challenging the existent nuclear architecture; and explores whether the treaty's enforcement might soon be diluted. The article concludes the NPT is unlikely to face fundamental threats in the foreseeable future. 1 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this discrepancy between the literature and privately held views within the nuclear policy community.

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“…Coe and Vaynman (2014) emphasize the role of superpower collusion in making the NPT-backed regime stable.…”

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confidence: 95%

Do Arms Control Treaties Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Fuhrmann

Lupu

2016

int stud q

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How do international arms control treaties influence state policies? This paper investigates this question by analyzing the efficacy of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The effects of the NPT have been fiercely debated over the last several decades, but scholars do not yet fully understand whether the treaty "works." A debate about the treaty's effects persists in part because existing studies suffer from a key limitation: they are not designed to infer a causal connection between NPT membership and nuclear proliferation. Prior research cannot determine whether membership in the treaty restrains states from developing nuclear weapons or simply reflects existing preferences. To address this limitation, this paper accounts for selection effects by using a measure of states' ex ante treaty commitment preferences. Our analysis of nuclear proliferation from 1970 to 2000 provides evidence that the NPT has played a key role in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. Even after accounting for strategic selection into the treaty, NPT ratification is robustly associated with a lower likelihood of pursuing nuclear weapons. Our results have broad implications for the study of how international institutions affect international politics.

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Collusion and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Cited by 65 publications

References 24 publications

A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War

A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War

Beyond Pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse

Do Arms Control Treaties Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

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