College-Major Choice to College-Then-Major Choice

Abstract

Many countries use college-major-specific admissions policies that require a student to choose a college-major pair jointly. Given the potential of student-major mismatches, we explore the equilibrium effects of postponing student choice of major. We develop a sorting equilibrium model under the college-major-specific admissions regime, allowing for match uncertainty and peer effects. We estimate the model using Chilean data. We introduce the counterfactual regime as a Stackelberg game in which a social planner chooses college-specific admissions policies and students make enrollment decisions, learn about their fits to various majors before choosing one. Our estimates indicate that switching from the baseline to the counterfactual regime leads to a 1% increase in average student welfare and that it is more likely to benefit female, low-income and/or low-ability students.

Choose Wisely: A Study of College Major Choice and Major Switching Behavior

“…The authors found that switching from a Chilean model to an open major choice system like the one that is in place in the United States would increase student welfare by one percent. This improvement in welfare was found to be even more pronounced for low income, low ability, and female students (Bordon and Fu, 2015).…”

“…Students there apply to specific major and university combination. The ability to transfer between programs is so limited that most students that want to switch programs must drop out and reapply to start over in another desired major/university combination (Bordon and Fu, 2015). On the other hand, very permissive systems like the one at many universities in the United States only lightly restrict transfers between majors and allow students to apply undeclared and remain so until they find a major choice that they like.…”

Freshmen Teachers and College Major Choice: Evidence from a Random Assignment in Chile

“…Students get enrolled only in the topmost program in which they got accepted. For a thorougher description of the Chilean higher education admission system, see Bordon and Fu (2015).…”

Market power and price discrimination in the US market for higher education

“…The most important decision is the choice of a major. Arcidiacono () and Bordon and Fu () develop and estimate dynamic models of choice of academic major under uncertainty. Last, in Epple et al.…”

“…The most important decision is the choice of a major. Arcidiacono (2005) and Bordon and Fu (2015) develop and estimate dynamic models of choice of academic major under uncertainty. Last, in Epple et al (2017), we developed the basic theoretical model to examine effects of policy changes on attendance patterns and student costs.…”