Collective risk-taking in the commons

Climate Policy, Irreversibilities and Global Economic Shocks

“…So, starting from x, in order to ful…ll (13), it is needed that u 0 goes up (lower x) and P s2S p s v 0 (m s x) must go down, with also happens by decrease in x. So, the equilibrium private consumption is lower than x if income is uncertain in Game 3.…”

“…Bramoullé and Treich (2009) study the setting where individuals face the same risk of damage from pollution and …nd that uncertainty reduces pollution emissions and improves individuals'welfare. Bochet et al (2019) study a modi…ed Nash demand game where agents can demand shares of a common pool resource, and the threshold level beyond which the amount of the resource available collapses to zero is subject to uncertainty. Kuusela and Laiho (2020) model a two-stage game where countries choose to strategically acquire information regarding the damages from pollution in the …rst stage, when this damage is uncertain, before committing to pollution abatement in the second stage.…”

Political Communication as a Tragedy of the Commons

“…We conclude that the ideas of Elinor Ostrom (1990) have important applications to political communication. Ostrom's ideas about community-based CPR governance help address this critical issue (Bouchet et al, 2019;Dardot and Laval, 2014;Gangadharan et al, 2017;Hardt and Negri, 2009;Ostrom et al, 1994;Weston and Bollier, 2013).…”

Social learning and communication with threshold uncertainty

“…Threshold public good games (ex. Barrett and Dannenberg, 2014;Suleiman et al, 2001;Croson and Marks, 2000) and similar common pool resource games have been rigorously explored in the lab (Gustafsson et al, 2000;Budescu et al, 1990;Budescu et al, 1995a;Budescu et al, 1995b;Gustafsson et al, 1999a, Gustafsson et al, 1999bRapoport et al, 1992;Rapoport et al, 1993;Suleiman et al, 1996;Bochet et al 2017). Most previous experiments involving coordination games did not investigate how communication could resolve threshold uncertainty, with some exceptions discussed below.…”

“…McBride (2006McBride ( , 2010 show that threshold uncertainty could be disruptive to coordination in a discrete public good game depending on the subject's belief about how important their contribution is to reach the unknown threshold. Bochet et al (2017) develop a model with threshold uncertainty in a shared resource where various levels of risk of resource collapse exist. The authors demonstrate a 'cautious equilibrium' which would guarantee the existence of the common resource and a 'dangerous equilibrium' which risks a collapse of the resource and find experimental evidence that subjects choose the 'dangerous equilibrium', though they do not test the effects of communication on these equilibria choices.…”