Collective Benefits, Exchange Interests, and Norm Enforcement

Horne, Christine

doi:10.1353/sof.2004.0041

Cited by 68 publications

(68 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Studies show that rates of civic participation are higher in neighborhoods with greater levels of disorder (Swaroop and Morenoff 2006) and the form and function of neighborhood participation is a function of the perceived severity of the problem (Marschall 2004; see also Perkins et al 1990). Third, responding to a neighborhood problem can have deleterious consequences for the individual (Horne 2004;Wells et al 2006). Individuals are rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of action and will avoid action, especially action that brings with it a degree of personal risk, if the failure to act does not attract any penalty (Oliver 1984; see also Horne 2004;Wells et al 2006).…”

Section: The Exercise Of Informal Social Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Third, responding to a neighborhood problem can have deleterious consequences for the individual (Horne 2004;Wells et al 2006). Individuals are rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of action and will avoid action, especially action that brings with it a degree of personal risk, if the failure to act does not attract any penalty (Oliver 1984; see also Horne 2004;Wells et al 2006). Thus individuals may be disinclined to respond to a particular threat if they receive the public good of living in a low crime environment without taking action (Steenbeek and Hipp 2011).…”

Section: The Exercise Of Informal Social Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Neighborhood Social Ties and Shared Expectations for Informal Social Control: Do They Influence Informal Social Control Actions?

et al. 2016

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Objectives Social disorganization states that neighborhood social ties and shared expectations for informal social control are necessary for the exercise of informal social control actions. Yet this association is largely assumed rather than empirically examined in the literature. This paper examines the relationship between neighborhood social ties, shared expectations for informal social control and actual parochial and public informal social control actions taken by residents in response to big neighborhood problems.Methods Using multi-level logistic regression models, we integrate Australian Bureau of Statistics census data with the Australian Community Capacity Study survey data of 1310 residents reporting 2614 significant neighborhood problems across 148 neighborhoods to examine specific informal social control actions taken by residents when faced with neighborhood problems. ResultsWe do not find a relationship between shared expectations for informal social control and residents' informal social control actions. Individual social ties, however, do lead to an increase in informal social control actions in response to 'big' neighborhood problems. Residents with strong ties are more likely to engage in public and parochial informal social control actions than those individuals who lack social ties. Yet individuals living in neighborhoods with high levels of social ties are only moderately more likely to engage in parochial informal social control action than those living in areas where these ties are not present. Shared expectations for informal social control are not associated with the likelihood that residents engage in informal social control actions when faced with a significant neighborhood problem.Conclusion Neighborhood social ties and shared expectations for informal social control are not unilaterally necessary for the exercise of informal social control actions. Our results challenge contemporary articulations of social disorganization theory that assume that the availability of neighborhood social ties or expectations for action are associated with residents actually doing something to exercise of informal social control.

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Section: The Exercise Of Informal Social Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Exercise Of Informal Social Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Neighborhood Social Ties and Shared Expectations for Informal Social Control: Do They Influence Informal Social Control Actions?

et al. 2016

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“…There is a rich tradition of experimental research in sociology (e.g., Bonacich and Light 1978;Cook and Hegtvedt 1983;Kollock 1998;Yamagishi, Jin and Kyonari 1999); controlled experiments played, in particular, an important role at the boundaries between sociology and social psychology (e.g., Marwell and Ames 1979;Yamagichi 1986;Lawler and Yoon 1993;Molm 1997;Stolte, Fine and Cook 2001;Buskens and Raub 2002;Simpson 2004;Horne 2004;Diekman 2004). However, the experimental method is generally not prominently featured in sociological research, and experimental results are rarely published in leading journals like the American Journal of Sociology and the American Sociological Review.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations

2007

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Since Durkheim, sociological explanations of social cooperation emphasize the internalization of values that induce norm compliance. Since Adam Smith, economic explanations of social cooperation emphasize incentives that induce selfish individuals to cooperate. Here we develop a general approach -the Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints approach -showing that each of the above models is a special case. Our approach is based on evidence indicating that pure Homo Sociologicus and pure Homo Economicus views are wrong. We show that self-regarding and norm-regarding actors coexist and that the available action opportunities determine which of these actor types dominates the aggregate level of social cooperation. Our approach contributes to the solution of long-standing problems, including the problems of social order and collective action, the determinants and consequences of social exchanges, the micro-foundations of emergent aggregate patterns of social interactions, and the measurement of the impact of cultural and economic practices on individuals' social goals. Abstract:Since Durkheim, sociological explanations of social cooperation emphasize the internalization of values that induce norm compliance. Since Adam Smith, economic explanations of social cooperation emphasize incentives that induce selfish individuals to cooperate. Here we develop a general approach -the Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints approach -showing that each of the above models is a special case. Our approach is based on evidence indicating that pure Homo Sociologicus and pure Homo Economicus views are wrong. We show that self-regarding and norm-regarding actors coexist and that the available action opportunities determine which of these actor types dominates the aggregate level of social cooperation. Our approach contributes to the solution of long-standing problems, including the problems of social order and collective action, the determinants and consequences of social exchanges, the micro-foundations of emergent aggregate patterns of social interactions, and the measurement of the impact of cultural and economic practices on individuals' social goals.

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“…The basic outcomes of the AMG simulation were replicated. Without metanorms, a norm against defection cannot survive; with a single metanorm structure, a norm against defection can evolve and survive in a group where parameters suggest "dependence" (see also Horne 2004). The examination of the correlated vengefulness hypothesis by decoupling Vengeance from Metavengeance clarified the suspected correlation between the two kinds of vengefulness.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolution of metanorms: quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

Prietula

Conway

2009

Comput Math Organ Theory

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How are norms maintained? Axelrod (in Am. Political Sci. Rev. 80(4): [1095][1096][1097][1098][1099][1100][1101][1102][1103][1104][1105][1106][1107][1108][1109][1110][1111] 1986) used an evolutionary computational model to proffer a solution: the metanorm (norm to enforce norm enforcement). Although often discussed, this model has neither been sufficiently replicated nor explored. In this paper we replicate and extend that model. Results were generally supportive of the original. Speculations in the original regarding the requirement to link sanctions underlying the metanorm structure were not supported, as differentiating punishment likelihoods against defectors from punishment likelihoods against shirkers (non-enforcers of the norm against defection) lead to more efficient and effective sanctioning structures that allowed norm emergence. Replications of the Groups game (two groups differing in numbers and power) generally supported the original reports, but true norms against defection emerged only if sanctioning structures were differentiated, resulting in the Strong group developing a dominant norm against others defecting (Metavengeance). That is, when groups are involved with differential power, Metanorms fail unless a more sophisticated sanctioning structure (Metavengeance) is supported.Keywords Norms · Metanorms · Evolutionary model · Cultural algorithm · Simulation Norms play essential roles in regulating aspects of social behavior in groups. Norms are viewed as quasi-formal rules and often "instruct strangers and convey to children" M.J. Prietula ( )

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Collective Benefits, Exchange Interests, and Norm Enforcement

Cited by 68 publications

References 41 publications

Neighborhood Social Ties and Shared Expectations for Informal Social Control: Do They Influence Informal Social Control Actions?

Neighborhood Social Ties and Shared Expectations for Informal Social Control: Do They Influence Informal Social Control Actions?

Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations

The evolution of metanorms: quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

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