Collective Action within the Household: Insights from Natural Resource Management

Abstract

Households face many collective action situations, with members working together to produce livelihoods and allocate goods. But neither unitary nor bargaining models of the household provide frameworks to analyze the conditions under which households work collectively and when they fail to do so. Drawing on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework based in the natural resource management literature, this paper explores the factors that encourage and inhibit collective action and provides insights into how to understand collective action problems within the household as dynamic, multi-actor situations with outcomes that can be evaluated by multiple criteria, not just efficiency.

Institutional Arrangements and Management of Environmental Resources in Ethiopia

“…Households are a basic institution in every society, although the exact form differs across time and location (Doss & Meinzen-Dick, 2015). In this study, an attempt was made to investigate institutions in relation to the formulation of policies, proclamations and regulations, strategy development and implementation of programs and projects.…”

“…One of the mechanisms could be revisiting the property rights systems in the country. Property right affect the incentives and structure for collective action at both the community and household level (Doss and Meinzen-Dick, 2015). For example, Natura 2000 is a network of core breeding and resting sites for rare and threatened species found within Europe's 28 member states.…”

“…(a) participation, (b) consultation, (c) representation and (d) appeal (United Nations, 2008). Also, planners in a landscape need to consider having strong networks to mobilize others or the ability to speak eloquently whenever there are decisions by consensus in an open meeting (Doss & Meinzen-Dick, 2015).…”

“…CBOs motivate well provided that incentive is available and the external support to enforce the law is conducive and predictable. Incentives can range from food aid in areas of food insecure woredas for community based area exclosures (Mengistu et al, 2005), lower taxes on revenues to protection of rights (Leite et al, 2014;Doss and Meinzen-Dick, 2015). It is presumed that when someone does not own a resource, one has no long-term interest in sustaining the resource over time and, thus, cannot be expected to act beneficially towards that resource (Ostrom and Cox, 2010).…”

Comparison of the Vegetables Farming System as the Best Model in Kaimana - Indonesia

“…Instead of intensive farming systems use non-family labor (wage) throughout the growing season. The different workers indicate different social institutional system in both groups of farmers, and not solely for the purpose of efficiency alone (Doss & Dick, 2015).…”