Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners' dilemma

Abstract

The problem of collective action to produce a group collective good is analyzed as the game of Individual vs. Collective and then as an n‐person game to show that, under the constraints of Mancur Olson's analysis, it is an n‐prisoners' dilemma in the cases of latent and intermediate groups. The usual analysis according to which noncooperation is considered the rational strategy for classical 2‐prisoners' dilemma is logically similar to Olson's analysis, which suggests that rational members of a latent group should not contribute toward the purchase of the group collective good. However, in the game analysis it is clear that the latent and intermediate groups are not logically different, but rather are distinguishable only statistically. Some prisoners' dilemma experimental results are used to suggest how the difference might arise and how the vast prisoners' dilemma literature can be related to the problem of collective action. The game of collective action is then analyzed not from the view of strategies but of outcomes. There is presented a theorem which states that the outcome in which all player‐members of a group pay and all benefit is a Condorcet choice from the set of realizable outcomes for the game. Hence the cooperative outcome in such a game would prevail in election against all other outcomes.

Influence and Social Tragedy in Networks

“…Our results are closely related to such a situation, since the commons dilemma is generally represented as a game of negative externalities (see, e.g., Hardin, 1971;Cornes and Sandler, 1983;Gardner et al, 1994). With the exception of Ilkiliç (2010), this literature typically assumes that players are arranged in a complete, undirected network (even if the assumption on the completeness of the network is generally not explicitly stated).…”

Forming Voting Blocs and Coalitions as a Prisoner's Dilemma: A Possible Theoretical Explanation for Political Instability

“…Conversely, joining a coalition is "uncooperative" behavior relative to the general electorate, who are being excluded from the coalition. The prisoner's dilemma and equivalent collective action games have long been considered as fundamental models for political conflict and cooperation (see Coase, 1960, Axelrod, 1970, and Hardin, 1971. As Figure 1 illustrates, it can be privately beneficial to join a coalition-especially if other voters have already done so.…”

Status Characteristics and the Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

“…As already indicated, Simpson et al (2012) establish that SCT applies to problems involving the voluntary provision of public goods. That is, essential scope conditions of SCT are fulfilled in classic problems of collective action such as n-person prisoner dilemmas (e.g., Hardin 1971;Hamburger 1973), linear public good games (e.g., Croson 2007;Chaudhuri 2011), or volunteer's dilemmas (cf. Diekmann 1985Przepiorka and Diekmann 2013;Diekmann and Przepiorka 2016).…”