Coleridge's Logic

Milnes, Tim

doi:10.1016/s1874-5857(08)80005-2

Cited by 23 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 8 publications

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“…For an early critique of Hacking's historiography, see Garber and Zabell 1979. 14. On Coleridge's logic, see Milnes 2008. England by Boole ([1847] 1998), who in The Mathematical Analysis of Logic first used "algebraic formulae . .…”

Section: Logic and Literature Through Historymentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction

Blevins

Williams

2020

Poetics Today

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Although literature and logic share a number of surprising symmetries and historical contacts, they have typically been seen to occupy separate disciplinary spheres. Declaring a subfield in literary studies — logic and literature — this introduction outlines various connections between literary formalism and formal logic. It surveys historical interactions and reciprocal influences between literary and logical writers from antiquity through the twentieth century, and it examines how literary theory and criticism have been institutionally shadowed by a logical unconscious, from the New Criticism and (post)structuralism to recent debates about historicism and formalism. It further considers how the subfield of logic and literature, in its constitutive attention to form, is neatly positioned to cut across these debates, and it sketches ways of reading at the interface of aesthetics, philosophy of literature, and literary studies that might be energized by an appeal to logical contexts, ideas, and methods.

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Section: Logic and Literature Through Historymentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction

Blevins

Williams

2020

Poetics Today

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“An Invaluable Acquisition”: Sandglasses in Romantic Literature

Tomalin

2017

European Romantic Review

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Coleridge’s Two-Level Theory of Metaphysical Knowledge and the Order of the Mental Powers in the Logic

Struwig¹

2017

Coleridge and Contemplation

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Coleridge is presented as a two-level theorist of the innate powers of mind in Chapter 11, which argues that Coleridge distinguishes (1) a transcendental, Kantian sense of the a priori principles of human discursive cognition (comparable to Plato’s mid-level diánoia), from (2) the noëtic, Platonic a priori principles of intellectual intuition (or nóēsis, a higher-level intuitive cognition of ontological, theological, and ethical truths). Drawing on Logic and Opus Maximum, the author demonstrates that Coleridge characterizes Kantian a priori principles as ‘subjectively real’, finite-mind-dependent rules of sense-experience and cognition, and Platonic a priori principles as ‘objectively real’ principles of knowing and being that are dependent upon ‘the transcendent and unindividual’ reason (i.e. God, ‘the absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind’). This ‘two-level’ theory is framed in terms of Coleridge’s Kantian ‘threefold division’ of the human cognitive capacities into sense, understanding, and reason, and their respective a priori operations and contents.

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Coleridge's Logic

Cited by 23 publications

References 8 publications

Introduction

Introduction

“An Invaluable Acquisition”: Sandglasses in Romantic Literature

Coleridge’s Two-Level Theory of Metaphysical Knowledge and the Order of the Mental Powers in the Logic

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