CoinLayering: An Efficient Coin Mixing Scheme for Large Scale Bitcoin Transactions

Lü, Ning; Chang, Yuan; Shi, Wenbo; Choo, Kim‐Kwang Raymond

doi:10.1109/tdsc.2020.3043366

Cited by 10 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Apparently, it is not applicable for the large-scale E-voting system, because on one hand the smaller size anonymous set cannot support strong anonymity for E-voting and on the other hand the large computation overhead degrades the efficiency of voting. For this, we have proposed a scalable coin mixing scheme [26,27], which breaks down the trading process into transferring stage and paying stage. e former deposits the transaction Bitcoins on a specified middleman (termed as holding Mixer) and further cuts off the link between these Bitcoins and the seller; the latter specify another middleman (termed as Paying Mixer) to advance the Bitcoins to buyer and then pay back the Bitcoins to this middleman after the mixing is over.…”

Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

BEvote: Bitcoin-Enabled E-Voting Scheme with Anonymity and Robustness

Lü

Choi

et al. 2021

Security and Communication Networks

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When building the large-scale distributed decision control system based on mobile terminal devices (MTDs), electronic voting (E-voting) is a necessary technique to settle the dispute among parties. Due to the inherent insecurity of Internet, it is difficult for E-voting to attain complete fairness and robustness. In this study, we argue that Bitcoin blockchain offers better options for a more practical E-voting. We first present a coin mixing-based E-voting system model, which can cut off the relationship between the voter’s real identity and its Bitcoin address to achieve strong anonymity. Moreover, we devise a secret sharing-based E-voting protocol, which can prevent voting number from being leaked ahead and further realize strong robustness. We establish the probable security theory to prove its security. In addition, we use the experimental evaluation to demonstrate its efficiency.

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Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

BEvote: Bitcoin-Enabled E-Voting Scheme with Anonymity and Robustness

Lü

Choi

et al. 2021

Security and Communication Networks

Self Cite

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“…Regarding the issue of protecting transaction privacy in blockchain, there have been several relevant studies [9][10][11], mainly focusing on two approaches: direct privacy protection and indirect privacy protection. Indirect privacy protection methods employ indirect means to protect transaction privacy, mainly through techniques such as coin mixing [12], ring signature [13], and stealth address [14]. Direct privacy protection methods directly hide transaction information and are mainly based on zero-knowledge proof.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privacy Protection Method for Blockchain Transactions Based on the Stealth Address and the Note Mechanism

Wei,

Fang,

Hong

et al. 2024

Applied Sciences

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Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology that possesses characteristics such as decentralization, tamper resistance, and programmability. However, while blockchain ensures transaction openness and transparency, transaction privacy is also at risk of being exposed. Therefore, this paper proposes the blockchain transaction privacy protection method based on the stealth address and the note mechanism to address the privacy leakage risk in blockchain public environments. Firstly, the proposed method generates a random seed known only to the parties involved based on the Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol, ensuring the privacy of transactions. Then, it utilizes the Note Commitments table to maintain the binding relationship between the stealth address and the corresponding note, enabling efficient transfer and verification of note ownership. The uniqueness of the stealth address is utilized as an invalidation identifier for notes in the Nullifier table, ensuring efficient verification of the correctness of note invalidation identifiers. Additionally, this method employs Pedersen commitment and Bulletproofs range proof to generate proof of the legality of transaction amounts, enabling the concealment of transaction amounts and facilitating private transactions between the parties involved. Finally, this paper presents a detailed performance analysis, implementation, and testing of the method. From the results, it can be concluded that the method proposed can effectively prevent fraudulent behavior by various transaction participants and ensure the security, privacy, and integrity of the transaction. Critical processes consume only milliseconds, and the related commitments and proofs are also minimal, which is crucial for controlling transaction costs. At the same time, this method achieves a completely decentralized privacy transaction solution.

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