Coherence, Evidence, and Legal Proof

Amaya, Amalia

doi:10.1017/s1352325213000025

Cited by 20 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 59 publications

(3 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The first theory we expound is the scenario theory of Van Koppen (2011, 2019). The second is the coherence theory of Amaya (2013Amaya ( , 2015 that builds upon Thagard's analysis of explanatory coherence (2000). We have chosen to discuss only these two theories, because these theories, in particular Amaya's theory that builds on Thagard's concept of coherence, offer the most elaborate analyses both of the concept of coherence and of the role coherence plays in theories about reasoning about evidence in law.…”

Section: The Coherence Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…15 2.2.3 Inference to the most coherent explanation. Amaya (2009Amaya ( , 2013 also offers an analysis of the process of coherence maximization. She argues that this process is an explanatory inference, which fits the model of IBE.…”

Section: E7 Acceptancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some scholars claim that legal fact-finders should evaluate evidence in terms of coherence (MacCormick 1980;Wagenaar, van Koppen Crombag 1993;Thagard 2000Thagard , 2004Bex 2011;Amaya 2013). Within the coherence approach various theories can be distinguished, among others the scenario theory advocated by Peter van Koppen (2011, also see Van Koppen and Mackor 2019) and the theory of explanatory coherence advocated by Paul Thagard (2000) and Amalia Amaya (2013Amaya ( , 2015 who combine it with inference to the best explanation (IBE) and propose that IBE should be imported into law and adapted to legal fact-finding.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Coherence and probability in legal evidence

Dahlman

Mackor²

2019

Law, Probability and Risk

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The authors investigate to what extent an evaluation of legal evidence in terms of coherence (suggested by Thagard, Amaya, Van Koppen and others) is reconcilable with a probabilistic (Bayesian) approach to legal evidence. The article is written by one author (Dahlman) with a background in the bayesian approach to legal evidence, and one author (Mackor) with a background in scenario theory. The authors find common ground but partly diverge in their conclusions. Their findings give support to the claim (reductionism) that coherence can be translated into probability without loss. Dahlman therefore concludes that the probabilistic vocabulary is superior to the coherence vocabulary, since it is more precise. Mackor is more agnostic in her conclusions about reductionism. In Mackor's view, the findings of their joint investigation do not imply that the probabilistic approach is superior to the coherentist approach.

show abstract

Section: The Coherence Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: E7 Acceptancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Coherence and probability in legal evidence

Dahlman

Mackor²

2019

Law, Probability and Risk

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…While both evidentialist and coherentist versions of explanationism have been articulated with a view to justifying scientific beliefs, they may be successfully applied to the legal domain. In previous work, I have developed a coherentist approach to evidence and legal proof that aims to explain the justification of evidentiary statements within the framework of explanatory coherentism (Amaya, 2013(Amaya, , 2015. Although, to the best of my knowledge, there has not been an effort to articulate and defend evidentialism explanationism into a theory of legal evidence and proof, the prospects of developing such a theory look promising.…”

Section: The Diversity Of Explanationismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The explanationist revolution in evidence law

Amaya

2019

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to Allen and Pardo, the field of evidence law has experienced a revolution -in Kuhn's sense- from probabilism to explanationism, which they identify with the relative plausibility theory. The explanationist revolution, argue Allen and Pardo, has placed explanationist -rather than probabilistic criteria- at the core of the fact-finding process and, in contrast to probabilism, has advanced a comparative understanding of the theory of legal proof. This paper develops an alternative interpretation of the explanationist revolution in evidence law. First, it elaborates on the concept of legal revolution and argues that it involves a kind of shift that is best characterized as a Hacking -rather than a Kuhnean- type of revolution and, thus, as an ‘emplacement’ instead of a ‘replacement’ revolution. Second, it claims that the shift from probabilism to explanationism involves a deep -genuinely revolutionary- change in the conception of rationality that is taken to govern the processes of evidence and legal proof. Other differences between probabilistim and explanationism, such as those mentioned by Allen and Pardo, are not central to the revolutionary shift, but rather emanate from this basic distinction. Last, it argues that the explanationist paradigm embraces, but cannot be reduced to, the relative plausibility theory; the identification of explanationism with the relative plausibility theory occludes the richness and possibilities harboured by the new, explanationist, paradigm.

show abstract

“…La evaluación referida de manera global al relato de hechos no puede garantizar, en cambio, que cada hecho principal se encuentre sufi cientemente sustentado en pruebas específi cas. Aun cuando a través de correcciones al modelo holista estándar, como las que sugieren Amaya (2008Amaya ( , 2013 y Bex et al (2010), se requiera que el relato de hechos que se acepta sea el que mejor integre (en los términos que resulten del estándar de prueba aplicable) los datos probatorios aportados al proceso, no es posible asegurar que lo que se predica del todo (la sufi ciencia de las pruebas respecto del relato global) sea predicable respecto de cada una de las partes (la sufi ciencia de las pruebas respecto de cada elemento principal del caso). 45 En otras pa-43 En un sentido semejante Bex y Verheij (2012, p. 342) advierten que el soporte probatorio podrá ser establecido, diferenciadamente, respecto de los diversos "elementos" del relato.…”

Section: Los Aspectos Atomistas De La Justifi Cación Probatoriaunclassified

Atomismo Y Holismo en La Justificación Probatoria

Accatino

2014

Iso

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

El trabajo explora la controversia entre las concepciones atomistas y holistas del razonamiento probatorio con el objeto de evaluar críticamente sus contribuciones desde la perspectiva de una teoría normativa de la justiﬁ cación de la decisión judicial sobre los hechos. La autora reconoce a las aproximaciones holistas el mérito de haber iluminado la relevancia semántica de la integración de las proposiciones a probar en un relato global del caso y la relevancia justiﬁ cativa de la integración explicativa entre cada una de ellas y el conjunto de pruebas disponibles. Pero a la vez sostiene que, por razones epistémicas y jurídicas, en la arquitectura de la justiﬁ cación probatoria cada hecho principal debe mantenerse atomísticamente diferenciado como objeto de prueba y respecto de cada elemento de prueba debe analizarse en forma individualizada su ﬁ abilidad y la solidez de la inferencia que lo conecta con un hecho principal.

show abstract

Coherence, Evidence, and Legal Proof

Cited by 20 publications

References 59 publications

Coherence and probability in legal evidence

Coherence and probability in legal evidence

The explanationist revolution in evidence law

Atomismo Y Holismo en La Justificación Probatoria

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About