Coherence and Systematization in Law

Amaya, Amalia

doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9452-0_22

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 90 publications

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“…But by that time, all evidence is already ‘past’. There is nothing to update (see, for example, Allen and Jehl, 2003; Amaya, 2007: 10–24). All of these problems speak to the descriptive and normative inaccuracy of probabilistic approaches to standards of proof.…”

Section: Probability-based Approach To Standards Of Proofmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can there be a burden of the best explanation?

Ribeiro

2018

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

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In this article I address a foundational question in evidence law: how should judges and jurors reason with evidence? According to a widely accepted approach, legal fact-finding should involve a determination of whether each cause of action is proven to a specific probability. In most civil cases, the party carrying the burden of persuasion is said to need to persuade triers that the facts she needs to prevail are “more likely than not” true. The problem is that this approach is both a descriptively and normatively inadequate account of reasoning with evidence in law. It does not offer a plausible picture of how people in general, and legal fact-finders in particular, reason with evidence. And it turns out that if we try to do what the approach tells us, we end up with absurd results. Faced with these difficulties, a group of evidence scholars has proposed an alternative. According to them, legal fact-finding should involve a determination of which hypothesis best explains the admitted evidence, rather than whether each cause of action is proven to a specific probability. My main contributions in this article are twofold. First, I elaborate on the many descriptive, normative and explanatory considerations in support of an explanation-based approach to standards. Second, I offer novel replies to pressing objections against that same approach.

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Section: Probability-based Approach To Standards Of Proofmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can there be a burden of the best explanation?

Ribeiro

2018

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

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Definitions in law across legal cultures and jurisdictions

Jopek-Bosiacka

2023

Handbook of Terminology

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Legal definitions organize legal texts; they create new legal concepts and clarify general language words for maximum precision. As such, they are subject to rigid drafting constraints. A comparative analysis of definitions (in common law, continental law, and that of the European Union) reveals various semantic, stylistic, text, or discursive conventions which mirror the differences between legal systems and legal cultures. The analysis integrates tools and selected methodologies from linguistics, legal theory, legal logic, logical semiotics, and comparative law. The point of reference will be the Anglo-Saxon, EU, and Polish legislative drafting guidelines. Model definitions are presented. A focus on the formulation of definitions across legal systems and cultures can contribute to the systematization of knowledge on definitions in law.

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Coherence and Systematization in Law

Cited by 2 publications

References 90 publications

Can there be a burden of the best explanation?

Can there be a burden of the best explanation?

Definitions in law across legal cultures and jurisdictions

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