Cognitive science and the law

Busey, Thomas A.; Loftus, Geoffrey R.

doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.12.004

Cited by 53 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…However, to a large extent, this poor correlation seems to be attributable to memory biases rather than to poor evaluation of visual uncertainty (27). Potentially more troubling are cases of reported decorrelations between confidence and performance following visual manipulations.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Flexible mechanisms underlie the evaluation of visual confidence

Barthelmé

Mamassian

2010

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Visual processing is fraught with uncertainty: The visual system must attempt to estimate physical properties despite missing information and noisy mechanisms. Sometimes high visual uncertainty translates into lack of confidence in our visual perception: We are aware of not seeing well. The mechanism by which we achieve this awareness-how we assess our own visual uncertainty -is unknown, but its investigation is critical to our understanding of visual decision mechanisms. The simplest possibility is that the visual system relies on cues to uncertainty, stimulus features usually associated with visual uncertainty, like blurriness. Probabilistic models of the brain suggest a more sophisticated mechanism, in which visual uncertainty is explicitly represented as probability distributions. In two separate experiments, observers performed a visual discrimination task in which confidence could be determined by the cues available (contrast and crowding or eccentricity and masking) or by their actual performance, the latter requiring a more sophisticated mechanism than cue monitoring. Results show that observers' confidence followed performance rather than cues, indicating that the mechanisms underlying the evaluation of visual confidence are relatively complex. This result supports probabilistic models, which imply the existence of sophisticated mechanisms for evaluating uncertainty.decision making | visual perception P erformance in a visual task cannot be perfect. When we try to infer some property of the physical world from visual data, there is always the chance that we will make a mistake. The possibility of error signals objective visual uncertainty: the more visual uncertainty, the higher the probability of an error. When asked how confident we feel in our visual judgment, we find it natural to estimate how strong that uncertainty is, if only by saying that we do not see well. Thus, the level of confidence actually reported by observers is a measure of subjective visual uncertainty.It has been known for some time that performance and confidence usually correlate in human observers (1), and more recently this has also been observed in certain nonhuman species (2). If one asks observers to recognize blurry letters, both confidence and performance will decrease with the amount of blur. Although this fact seems intuitively obvious, the mechanisms involved in the correlation between performance and confidence have only recently begun to be investigated (3-6). A wide array of mechanisms could account for such a correlation, and finding out which one is actually at work could yield important insights into decision-making processes in the brain (7).In any given visual task, such as letter recognition, performance is determined by a large number of factors: Some have to do with the stimulus (its level of blur, its size, etc.), some have to do with its context (surrounding letters), and some have to do with the internal constraints of the visual system (neural stochasticity, the shape of receptive fields, the availability ...

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Flexible mechanisms underlie the evaluation of visual confidence

Barthelmé

Mamassian

2010

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…Busey and Loftus (2007) discussed several forms of bias that can occur during the eyewitness identification process, such as "unconscious transference" (p. 112). This occurs when the eyewitness identifies an individual whom s/he does in fact remember, but the witness remembers the individual from a time or place other than from the scene of the crime (e.g., having seen the person in a grocery store, the eyewitness erroneously "remembers" this individual as the perpetrator of the crime).…”

Section: Factors Limiting the Reliability Of Eyewitness Identificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of Experiencing the Eyewitness Identification Procedure on Juror Decisions

Duckworth

Kreiner

Stark-Wroblewski

et al. 2010

J Police Crim Psych

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Mistaken eyewitness identifications are believed to contribute to a preponderance of wrongful convictions, underscoring the need to identify methods to help decrease the likelihood of false convictions based on eyewitness testimony. The present study tested the hypothesis that providing jurors with first-hand experience with eyewitness identification procedures could help further sensitize them to the limitations of eyewitness testimony. Eighty college students watched a videotaped mock trial in which the prosecution's sole evidence was eyewitness testimony. In a 2×2 randomized factorial design, we manipulated whether participants heard expert psychological testimony (henceforth referred to as expert testimony) on the limitations of eyewitness identification and whether they experienced an eyewitness identification procedure. As predicted, experiencing the eyewitness identification procedure had a significant impact on juror decisions, suggesting that this procedure could further help reduce the likelihood of wrongful convictions.

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“…In fact, so far this year (2007), nearly a third of the published research papers on eyewitness identification utilize anecdotes of mistaken identification cases to introduce their topic of inquiry (Busey & Loftus, 2007;Haw, Dickinson, & Meissner, 2007;Keast, Brewer, & Wells, 2007;Krug, 2007;Lindsay, 2007;MacLin, & Phelan, 2007;Neuschatz, Lawson, Fairless, Powers, Neuschatz, & Goodsell, 2007;Remijn, & Crombag, 2007;Wells & Hasel, 2007). Additionally, DNA exoneration cases in relation to the issue of mistaken eyewitness identification are also cited in cases in which eyewitness memory experts have been involved (e.g., People v. Adams, 2008;People v. Copeland, 2007;United States v. Burton, 1998).…”

Section: Experts Should Not Generalize From Dna Exoneration Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%