Cognitive Radio game for secondary spectrum access problem

Attar, Alireza; Nakhai, Mohammad Reza; Aghvami, A.H.

doi:10.1109/twc.2009.080884

Cited by 128 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…For instance, the counter-measures to SSDF attacks include deploying a reputation metric to denote the scale of trustworthiness of each user [7], or reporting continuous sensing result to minimal attacks [8]. Game theory and Q-learning algorithm are often utilized to discuss attacker-SU action patterns [9] and to detect selfish users [10]. In confront of common control channel jamming attack, traditional communication technique of channel hopping is proved efficient for SUs exchanging channel information via multiple common control channels stochastically [11].…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploration of Singular Spectrum Analysis for Online Anomaly Detection in CRNs

Dong¹,

Yang²,

Chen³

et al. 2017

ICST Transactions on Security and Safety

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Cognitive radio networks (CRNs) have been recognized as a promising technology that allows secondary users (SUs) extensively explore spectrum resource usage efficiency, while not introducing interference to licensed users. Due to the unregulated wireless network environment, CRNs are susceptible to various malicious entities. Thus, it is critical to detect anomalies in the first place. However, from the perspective of intrinsic features of CRNs, there is hardly in existence of an universal applicable anomaly detection scheme. Singular Spectrum Analysis (SSA) has been theoretically proven an optimal approach for accurate and quick detection of changes in the characteristics of a running (random) process. In addition, SSA is a model-free method and no parametric models have to be assumed for different types of anomalies, which makes it a universal anomaly detection scheme. In this paper, we introduce an adaptive parameter and component selection mechanism based on coherence for basic SSA method, upon which we built up a sliding window online anomaly detector in CRNs. Our experimental results indicate great accuracy of the SSA-based anomaly detector for multiple anomalies.

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Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploration of Singular Spectrum Analysis for Online Anomaly Detection in CRNs

Dong¹,

Yang²,

Chen³

et al. 2017

ICST Transactions on Security and Safety

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The comparison between cooperative and noncooperative approaches has been presented in [16] through game theoretical analysis. The authors of [17] develop the optimal resource allocation strategies in secondary spectrum access problem using cooperative game theory. This work applies the concept of Nash bargaining solution to guarantee fairness and maximize the utility of the system optimality.…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The transmit power of an SU is equal to 0.01 W, and the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and variance σ 2 = 10 −11 W is considered at the input of the receiver. For SU i , its SNR can be calculated by (17), where P i is the transmit power of SU i , and d i is the distance between SU i and PU:…”

Section: The Nbmf-pso Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two novel price-based algorithms for spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks

Weng

Lee

Chen

2013

J Wireless Com Network

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Cognitive radio network is expected to use flexible radio frequency spectrum sharing techniques for achieving more efficient frequency spectrum usage. In this article, we consider the spectrum sharing problem that one primary user (PU) can share its frequency spectrum by renting this spectrum to multiple secondary users (SUs). The pricing scheme is a key issue for spectrum sharing in cognitive radio network. We first propose a nonlinear one-leader-multiple-follower (NLMF) sharing spectrum scheme as a multi-object optimization problem; the prices are offered by PU to SUs at the same time. This problem can be solved using particle swarm optimization (PSO); SUs gradually and iteratively adjust their strategies respectively based on the observations on their opponents' previous strategies until Nash equilibrium is completed. We then present a general nonlinear bilevel one-leader-multiple-follower (NBMF) optimization problem to further consider the revenue of the PU and a new optimal strategic pricing optimization technique which applies bilevel programming and swarm intelligence. A leader-follower game is formulated to obtain the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium for spectrum sharing that considers not only revenue of a PU but also the SUs utility. We develop a swarm particle algorithm to iteratively solve the problem defined in the NBMF decision model for searching the strategic pricing optimization. The behaviors of two pricing models have been evaluated, and the performance results show that the proposed algorithms perform well to solve the spectrum sharing in a cognitive radio network.

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“…The primary network has a base station (e.g., cellular systems [26], TV broadcast networks [27]), whose location is known by the CR network, and multiple users, which are uniformly distributed across the network. In addition, this primary network has a requirement on the detection probability of the CR network in order to guarantee that its QoS will not be degraded due to allowing opportunistic access for SUs.…”

Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

An auction-based mechanism for cooperative sensing in cognitive networks

Shi

Comaniciu

2011

Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Cognitive Radio and Advanced Spectrum Management

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OATAO is an open access repository that collects the work of Toulouse researchers and makes it freely available over the web where possible. This is an author-deposited version published in : http://oatao.univ-toulouse.fr/ Eprints ID : 12500 Abstract-In this paper, we propose an auction-based cooperative sensing protocol for secondary users in cognitive networks. The proposed auction mechanism is based on a novel modified Vickrey auction with a three dimensional bid, that accounts for detection gains as well as for virtual currency gains. We present a formal proof to show that the proposed three dimensional bidding mechanism preserves the truthfulness property of the classic Vickrey auction. The cooperative auction is combined with a prioritized access scheme to increase the efficiency and to reduce the response time for the coalition formation procedure. Our auction-based cooperative sensing mechanism can be easily applied to different network scenarios, by defining specific utility functions. The proposed cooperative sensing auctioning mechanism is illustrated for both downlink and uplink. Our simulation results show that users' cooperation is incentivized by the proposed algorithm, which leads to significant detection gains for the downlink and the uplink scenarios, with a more efficient energy expenditure.

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Cognitive Radio game for secondary spectrum access problem

Cited by 128 publications

References 19 publications

Exploration of Singular Spectrum Analysis for Online Anomaly Detection in CRNs

Exploration of Singular Spectrum Analysis for Online Anomaly Detection in CRNs

Two novel price-based algorithms for spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks

An auction-based mechanism for cooperative sensing in cognitive networks

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