Cognitive psychologists as expert witnesses: A problem in professional ethics.

Abstract

The first part of this paper defines a central problem for professional ethics: whether agents in professional roles are to act on their own moral perceptions or rather defer to those with special authority to make decisions within particular institutional settings. Specifically, should the psychologist decide for himself whether and how to testify as an expert witness, or should he allow the judge and lawyer to settle these questions for him? I argue that he must decide for himself and attempt to control the nature of his testimony. Given this preliminary conclusion, the second part of the paper argues on direct moral grounds first for a general presumption in favor of psychologists' testimony on the accuracy of eyewitnesses. Such testimony fits the legal criterion of reasonable doubt, if the psychologists' information is more accurate than that of the average juror and lawyer. Second, it is argued that the expert witness must resist intense adversarial pressures and present his testimony as impartially and objectively as possible. THE MORAL FRAMEWORKThe initial moral issues that face a psychologist who considers whether and how to testify as an expert witness share a common structure that exemplifies the central issue in professional ethics itself. The psychologist will ponder his role within the trial context. He will question whether he can properly act as an advocate or whether he must remain objective and neutral (and whether the latter stance is possible in an adversarial setting). He will wonder whether he can leave it to the judge to decide if his testimony is admissible and to the jury to decide how to interpret it once it has been admitted. Should he take the chance that his testimony will be twisted to one or the other lawyer's purpose, that it might be used to effect a result to which he is morally opposed, or that it might have an adverse effect on the jury's deliberation, leading them to the wrong decision? The preliminary but most fundamental issue under which these different questions are subsumed is whether the psychologist must weigh the possible uses and effects of

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