Cognitive hierarchies in the minimizer game

Berger, Ulrich; Silva, Hannelore De; Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2016.08.004

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 25 publications

(28 reference statements)

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“…I wish to remark that we first used the minimizer game to test a parameter-free version of Poisson cognitive hierarchy theory and observed results that were very close to the predictions of that model 21 . For the current experiment, however, a short calculation reveals that the Poisson cognitive hierarchy model predicts p L = 0.502 for both treatments, which is also far from the actual frequency of choices and deviates from the Nash prediction in the wrong direction.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 71%

“…Here, we present the first formal experimental test of the predictions of the CAE concept outside of the class of social dilemma games by using the minimizer game (MG), which requires randomization under social projection and was recently introduced in 21 as a testbed for comparing choice predictions in one-shot games. The MG is specifically designed to circumvent the problems associated with the fact that monetary incentives are biased by social preferences.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Co-action equilibrium fails to predict choices in mixed-strategy settings

Berger

2018

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Social projection is the tendency to project one's own characteristics onto others. This phenomenon can potentially explain cooperation in prisoner's dilemma experiments and other social dilemmas. The social projection hypothesis has recently been formalized for symmetric games as co-action equilibrium and for general games as consistent evidential equilibrium. These concepts have been proposed to predict choice behavior in experimental one-shot games. We test the predictions of the co-action equilibrium concept in a simple binary minimizer game experiment. We find no evidence of social projection.In social psychology, social projection is the well-established tendency of people to project their own preferences, beliefs and behaviors onto other members of their own social groups 1 . This concept grew out of early research on the false consensus effect 2 and has been extensively studied in recent decades 3 . In decision-making contexts, social projection results from evidential reasoning 4 . According to the theory of evidential decision-making, this kind of reasoning is evoked when an agent perceives other agents about whom he has no specific knowledge as belonging to the same social group as he does (his ingroup) and as being in the same decision-making situation. The agent then treats his own decision as diagnostic for the other agents' decisions; i.e., he projects his own choices onto them. When transferred to a strategic context, this means that a player in a symmetric game believes that other players will choose the same (possibly mixed) strategy as she herself does.Evidential reasoning is relatively uncontroversial if applied after one's own choice has been made. However, some researchers have proposed evidential reasoning as a rational way to choose a strategy by deliberating on the consequences of one's own hypothetical choices in combination with the resulting choices of others. According to this view, a player in a prisoner's dilemma situation should reason that if she cooperates, her opponent will be likely to cooperate as well, whereas if she defects, he will also be likely to defect. Comparing her own payoffs in the two resulting strategy profiles, (C, C) and (D, D), will then lead the player to choose cooperation. Early arguments along these lines have been prominently-and controversially-presented by Rapoport 5 and Hofstadter 6

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 71%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Co-action equilibrium fails to predict choices in mixed-strategy settings

Berger

2018

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“…Es por eso que algunos de ellos se mezclaron con un modelo de preferencia social, como en Bernasconi y Galizzi (2010) y Martin (2017). El 14,92 % utilizó modelos de jerarquía cognitiva o de nivel-k debido al estudio de las condiciones iniciales de un juego a través de la racionalidad, como Berger et al (2016) y Dufwenberg et al (2011. Además, utilizaron modelos de jerarquía cognitiva debido al examen de cómo los individuos interpretan la información, como en Jin (2020) y Kostelic (2020).…”

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“…Betting games(Brocas et al, 2014), auctions(Crawford and Iriberri, 2007b), and coordination games(Crawford et al, 2008) are examples of the games for which L model explains well the experimental data.2 Lottery games(Östling et al, 2011), coordination games(Costa-Gomes et al, 2009), action commitment games(Carvalho and Santos-Pinto, 2014), and minimizer game(Berger et al, 2016) are among the games where CH model proved powerful in explaining the experimental data.3 Although it is the term used in the literature, "self-awareness" should not be confounded with the capacity for introspection often meant by in, for example, psychology. What is meant here is the capacity for projecting the self to others, which has little to do with introspection.4Camerer et al (2004, fn.…”

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confidence: 99%