Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study

Blume, Andreas; Gneezy, Uri

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.011

Cited by 45 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…If the decision makers cannot communicate before or while they make their decisions, then they need to tacitly coordinate their beliefs and actions. An important theoretical and empirical question (see for example Blume and Gneezy (2010), Crawford et al (2008), Holm (2000), Isoni et al (2013), Mehta et al (1994a), Mehta et al (1994b), andSchelling (1960)) is if the decision makers will manage to identify a focal point that helps them to avoid a costly failure to coordinate.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The focality of dominated compromises in tacit coordination situations: Experimental evidence

Bett

Poulsen

2016

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

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We experimentally investigate if subjects in a tacit coordination situation with a conflict of interest tend to choose an equal compromise, even if it is strictly dominated. The data show that this is the case, as long as the compromise payoffs are not too low. Game comparisons suggest that choosing a dominated compromise is a focal point that allows subjects to avoid a costly coordination failure.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The focality of dominated compromises in tacit coordination situations: Experimental evidence

Bett

Poulsen

2016

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

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“…In their experiment, objects vary in characteristics such as shape, color, and size, and while differences in some characteristics are easy to spot right away, others require subjects to "notice" them, which is more a matter of psychological perception than mathematical logic. The recent paper by Blume and Gneezy (2010) studies coordination games in which sophisticated players can arrive at the unique choice by using logical inferences. Authors carefully control for nonpayoff-related symmetries and find that players play differently against themselves than against other player.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Ignorance Is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs

Agranov

Schotter

2012

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to communicate the value of a payoff relevant state of the world to a set of players who play a coordination game with multiple equilibria. While the Announcer and the players agree that coordination is desirable, since the payoffs of the players at the equilibria are unequal, they disagree as to which equilibrium is best. We demonstrate experimentally that in such coordination games, in order to mask the asymmetry of equilibrium payoffs, it may be advantageous for a utilitarian benevolent Announcer to communicate in an ambiguous or vague manner. (JEL C71, D81, D83)

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“…Most studies concern battle-of-the-sexes games where forward induction generates asymmetric payoffs, so there is tension between what's best for different players in contrast to our all-symmetric setting. Cooper et al (1992) and Blume & Gneezy (2010) use symmetric games, but the former add an asymmetry via their outside option and the latter focus on cognitive limitations that lack counterpart in our setting. No previous study considered forward induction based on social preferences.…”

Section: The No-intervention-agreement Proposalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thanks but no thanks: A new policy to reduce land conflict

Dufwenberg

Köhlin

Martinsson

et al. 2016

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Land conflicts in developing countries are costly. An important policy goal is to create respect for borders. This often involves mandatory, expensive interventions. We propose a new policy design, which in theory promotes neighborly relations at low cost. A salient feature is the option to by-pass regulation through consensus. The key idea combines the insight that social preferences transform social dilemmas into coordination problems with the logic of forward induction. As a first, low-cost pass at empirical evaluation, we conduct an experiment among farmers in the Ethiopian highlands, a region exhibiting features typical of countries where borders are often disputed. Our results suggest that a low-cost land delimitation based on neighborly recognition of borders could deliver a desired low-conflict situation if accompanied by an optional higher cost demarcation process. JEL-Code: C780, C930, D630, Q150. Terms of use: Documents inKeywords: conflict, land-conflict game, social preferences, forward induction, Ethiopia, experiment, land reform. Martin Dufwenberg

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Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study

Cited by 45 publications

References 34 publications

The focality of dominated compromises in tacit coordination situations: Experimental evidence

The focality of dominated compromises in tacit coordination situations: Experimental evidence

Ignorance Is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs

Thanks but no thanks: A new policy to reduce land conflict

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