Cognitive cladistics and cultural override in Hominid spatial cognition

Abstract

Current approaches to human cognition often take a strong nativist stance based on Western adult performance, backed up where possible by neonate and infant research and almost never by comparative research across the Hominidae. Recent research suggests considerable cross-cultural differences in cognitive strategies, including relational thinking, a domain where infant research is impossible because of lack of cognitive maturation. Here, we apply the same paradigm across children and adults of different cultures and across all nonhuman great ape genera. We find that both child and adult spatial cognition systematically varies with language and culture but that, nevertheless, there is a clear inherited bias for one spatial strategy in the great apes. It is reasonable to conclude, we argue, that language and culture mask the native tendencies in our species. This cladistic approach suggests that the correct perspective on human cognition is neither nativist uniformitarian nor ''blank slate'' but recognizes the powerful impact that language and culture can have on our shared primate cognitive biases. cognitive evolution ͉ cultural differences ͉ great apes

Spatial language influences memory for spatial scenes

“…When conversing, people are particularly likely (1) to encode and reason using the semantic tools provided by their language and (2) to honor the semantic distinctions of the language. Our findings are compatible with such a thinking-for-language account, although of course they do not rule out stronger effects of language in other contexts (see Haun, Rapold, Call, Janzen, & Levinson, 2006;Majid et al, 2004). Our findings here are less dramatic than those predicted by the strong Whorfian hypothesis, but they still leave room for pervasive semantic effects, given the prominence of language in human mental life.…”

Great apes’ capacities to recognize relational similarity

“…Using this comparative approach [also sometimes called 'cognitive cladistics', (Haun, Rapold et al, 2006)], we may find some cognitive skills shared across all members of a phylogenetic family, in our case the great apes (Hominidae: orangutans, gorillas, bonobos, chimpanzees and humans), while others will only occur in a subset of these species. Where patterns of skill distribution match the known phylogenetic tree of relatedness, we will be able to trace the phylogenetic inheritance of these traits, thus gaining access to the likely evolutionary history of the relevant abilities.…”

“…(Gentner, 2003;Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005;Rattermann & Gentner, 1998). Furthermore, cross-linguistic differences in spatial relational language and parallel differences in processing-preferences for spatial relations have served as further indicators for the interaction between relational language and thought (Bowerman & Choi, 2001;Haun, Rapold, Call, Janzen, & Levinson, 2006;Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & Levinson, 2004). None of these authors has stated that the ability for language was necessary for recognizing relational similarity, however, the late acquisition in children, the interrelation with language and the central function in so many human cognitive abilities has led researchers to propose that the ability to recognize relational similarity is extraordinarily pronounced in humans (Oden, Thompson, & Premack, 2001;Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008;Premack, 1983;Thompson & Oden, 1995, 2000 if not even the one thing that ''makes us smart" (Gentner, 2003).…”

“…With regard to the question of proper species comparisons, a recent set of publications outlines a powerful approach, which compares behaviour of modern primates in conjunction with an accurate phylogenetic tree of relatedness to chart early evolutionary history of cognition and the unique features of human cognition amongst primates (Byrne, 1995(Byrne, , 2000Haun, Rapold et al, 2006;Nunn & Barton, 2001).…”

Evidence from an emerging sign language reveals that language supports spatial cognition

“…Left-right language has also been implicated in an implicit rulelearning task using a tabletop array (21). Speakers of a language that uses allocentric spatial expressions (e.g., "north of me") and great apes from a variety of species all found it more difficult to learn a table-top pattern that maintained egocentric spatial relations (e.g., to the participant's left) than allocentric ones (e.g., to the north).…”