Cognitive ability and the effect of strategic uncertainty

Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Jacquemet, Nicolas; Luchini, Stéphane; Zylbersztejn, Adam

doi:10.1007/s11238-015-9525-9

Cited by 26 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 46 publications

(40 reference statements)

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“…The incentives of player Bs, in turn, go in the opposite direction: the gain from using the dominant strategy r (and conditional on player As' choice R ) is lower in Game 1 [with payoff increasing from 4.75 to 5 between ( R, l ) and ( R, r )] than in Game 2 (where payoff increases from 8.5 to 10). In line with Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn ( 2014 ) and Hanaki et al ( 2016 ) (who report that both players only react to their own monetary incentives) and as discussed in Section 3.1, each of these games generates sizable yet diverse empirical violations of dominance solvability. These two games together thus provide a wide range of monetary incentives to use dominance solvability within a common strategic environment 9 .…”

Section: Experimental Designsupporting

confidence: 70%

“…Each of the four resulting experimental treatments is implemented through a between-subject procedure—each subject participates in only one experimental condition. This data come from a large dataset, part of which has been previously used by Hanaki et al ( 2016 ). The main focus of that study is player As' behavior under strategic uncertainty and its relation to monetary incentives and fluid intelligence.…”

Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 9 Herein, we restrict our design to these two game matrices and do not seek to further investigate the effects of monetary incentives on both players' behavior. These effects are analyzed in detail in Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn ( 2014 ) and Hanaki et al ( 2016 ). …”

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confidence: 99%

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Fluid Intelligence and Cognitive Reflection in a Strategic Environment: Evidence from Dominance-Solvable Games

et al. 2016

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Dominance solvability is one of the most straightforward solution concepts in game theory. It is based on two principles: dominance (according to which players always use their dominant strategy) and iterated dominance (according to which players always act as if others apply the principle of dominance). However, existing experimental evidence questions the empirical accuracy of dominance solvability. In this study, we study the relationships between the key facets of dominance solvability and two cognitive skills, cognitive reflection, and fluid intelligence. We provide evidence that the behaviors in accordance with dominance and one-step iterated dominance are both predicted by one's fluid intelligence rather than cognitive reflection. Individual cognitive skills, however, only explain a small fraction of the observed failure of dominance solvability. The accuracy of theoretical predictions on strategic decision making thus not only depends on individual cognitive characteristics, but also, perhaps more importantly, on the decision making environment itself.

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Section: Experimental Designsupporting

confidence: 70%

Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fluid Intelligence and Cognitive Reflection in a Strategic Environment: Evidence from Dominance-Solvable Games

et al. 2016

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“…Evidence from experimental economics literature on strategic thinking suggests that the cost of learning in interactive settings varies with fluid intelligence 35 – 40 . Studies in cultural evolution literature find a variation in social learning strategies that depends on social group and individual characteristics 13 , 32 , 41 , 42 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Intelligence in Social Learning

Vostroknutov

Polonio

Coricelli

2018

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Studies in cultural evolution have uncovered many types of social learning strategies that are adaptive in certain environments. The efficiency of these strategies also depends on the individual characteristics of both the observer and the demonstrator. We investigate the relationship between intelligence and the ways social and individual information is utilised to make decisions in an uncertain environment. We measure fluid intelligence and study experimentally how individuals learn from observing the choices of a demonstrator in a 2-armed bandit problem with changing probabilities of a reward. Participants observe a demonstrator with high or low fluid intelligence. In some treatments they are aware of the intelligence score of the demonstrator and in others they are not. Low fluid intelligence individuals imitate the demonstrator more when her fluid intelligence is known than when it is not. Conversely, individuals with high fluid intelligence adjust their use of social information, as the observed behaviour changes, independently of the knowledge of the intelligence of the demonstrator. We provide evidence that intelligence determines how social and individual information is integrated in order to make choices in a changing uncertain environment.

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“…Previous research (Dequech, 2001;Hanaki, Jacquemet, Luchini, & Zylbersztejn, 2015) has widely confirmed that sensitivity to uncertainties has a prevalent impact on the rationality of choicemaking. Individuals sometimes avoid risk and sometimes seek it.…”

Section: Uncertaintiesmentioning

confidence: 90%

Understanding the implementation gap of China’s urban pension scheme at the level of rural-urban migrant workers

Wang¹

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China has recently undergone extensive reforms in its basic urban old-age pension policy, which intends to benefit all urban workers, including internal rural-to-urban migrant workers. In 2011, the Social Security Law, the first comprehensive law of China attempting to remedy social inequality, came into force. China has established pension schemes for both rural and urban workers.All workers employed in urban regions are entitled to the urban pension scheme, which offers pension benefits based on the cost of living in cities. However, implementation of the system and loopholes in the legislation have resulted in very low participation by migrant workers in the basic urban old-age pension scheme. As of the end of 2013, the migrant worker coverage rate of the oldage pension scheme remained less than 20% (NBS, 2014a). This gives rise to the following question: What implementation gaps hinder migrant workers from taking up this old-age scheme?Implementation gaps may occur throughout the entire policy implementation process, in which stakeholders at all levels (including policy makers, bureaucrats and recipients) play a role in the success of the policy. This thesis examined the implementation gap in the urban pension scheme at the bottom level, where rural-urban migrant workers constitute the potential recipients.Conceptualised using Mazmanian and Sabatier's (1983) implementation theory and the theory of bounded rationality, the study focused on factors that influenced migrant workers' intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme and their perceptions of taking up the scheme.The research adopted a mixed-method approach with quantitative survey and qualitative interview data collected and analysed sequentially.In Phase 1, over 200 migrant workers were surveyed in Shenzhen, China, on their understanding of the urban pension scheme (including their intentions to join) and on factors that might influence their intentions to join (individual, land, settlement, and employment). Bivariate analysis and multiple regression models were used to statistically examine the main factors that influenced migrant workers' intentions to join the scheme. This analysis showed that workers' settlement plans (the likelihood to settle in cities and the decision to go back to their rural iii hometown) and land expropriation experience significantly influenced the intention to participate in the urban pension system. Furthermore, approximately 85% of survey participants did not understand the basics of the urban old-age pension scheme.Phase 2 consisted of semi-structured interviews with 12 migrant workers, which were designed to explore their perceptions of joining the urban old-age pension scheme. Based on preliminary results from the quantitative study, six migrant workers with land expropriation experience and six without were selected from the survey participants. Interview transcripts were subjected to thematic analysis. The rich elaborations in these interviews provided a detailed picture of the processes by which migra...

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Cognitive ability and the effect of strategic uncertainty

Cited by 26 publications

References 46 publications

Fluid Intelligence and Cognitive Reflection in a Strategic Environment: Evidence from Dominance-Solvable Games

Fluid Intelligence and Cognitive Reflection in a Strategic Environment: Evidence from Dominance-Solvable Games

The Role of Intelligence in Social Learning

Understanding the implementation gap of China’s urban pension scheme at the level of rural-urban migrant workers

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