“…Although bidding one's value is a weakly dominant strategy in second-price private-value auctions (henceforth SPAs), there is substantial heterogeneity in bidding behavior, even among experienced bidders (Garratt and Wooders, 2010). Li (2017) suggests that overbidding in SPAs may result from the fact that a cognitively limited agent may not recognize true-value bidding as the weakly dominant strategy in SPAs, and, indeed, recent contributions indicate that cognitive ability may predict overbidding in SPAs (see, e.g., Bartling and Netzer, 2016;Lee et al, 2020). Bidders with higher cognitive ability are more likely to adhere to true-value bidding whereas cognitively less able bidders are prone to overbid, and, among those who overbid, deviations from true values are stronger for cognitive less able bidders.…”