Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission

Abstract

Why do powerful states often channel coercive policies through international organizations~IOs!? The article explains this phenomenon by theorizing the political advantages of working through a neutral institution, defined as one with heterogeneous and representative member preferences+ The argument centers on the notion of strategic information transmission+ IO involvement sends information about the coercer's intentions and the consequences of the coercive policy to foreign leaders and their publics, information that determines the level of international support offered to the coercing state+ The logic helps explain why the United Nations Security Council plays a unique role in approving and disapproving the use of force+ A case study of the 1990-91 Gulf War shows how these information transmission mechanisms work in practice and that the rationalist information argument provides more traction than a legitimacy-based alternative explanation+ Why do powerful states channel coercive foreign policies through international organizations~IOs!? Governments that lack resources or expertise often require IO assistance for material and technical reasons, and weak states rely on international forums to increase their political clout and bargaining power+ Powerful states, by contrast, typically do not need IOs to achieve specific objectives+ On the contrary, because turning to an international institution complicates policymaking and entails some loss of autonomy, one might expect powerful states to avoid such entanglements+ Yet even superpowers sometimes channel coercive actions, including the use of force, through IOs, despite viable alternatives that offer more flexibility and control-namely unilateralism and ad hoc multilateralism+ The liter-For valuable comments on earlier drafts, I would like to thank

Politics and IMF Conditionality

“…Also see Chapman and Reiter 2004, Chapman 2007, Thompson 2006, and Fang 2008 See O'Neill 1996, Russett 1997, Strand and Rapkin 2011, and Weiss 2008. .…”

UN interventions: The role of geography

“…Thompson (2006) describes why powerful states may use major international organizations to pursue their interests. Oatley and Yackee (2004) conclude that the US may use its influence in the IMF for its own purposes.…”

Informal Governance in the European Union

“…Mitra (2002) argues that inefficiencies arise from fixed lobbying costs. On the signaling function of institutions, see also Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002, 480;and Thompson 2006. 3. I therefore use the term "uncertainty" instead of "risk".…”