Coercion-Resistant Internet Voting with Everlasting Privacy

Locher, Philipp; Haenni, Rolf; Koenig, Reto E.

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_11

Cited by 17 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…To the best of our knowledge, current filtering schemes that offer a trustless deniable voting scheme which, at the same time have public verifiability, are the ones proposed by Achenbach et al [26], Locher et al [27], Locher et al [28] and Lueks et al [29]. The first three use similar solutions.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

NetVote: A Strict-Coercion Resistance Re-Voting Based Internet Voting Scheme with Linear Filtering

et al. 2020

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This paper proposes NetVote, an internet voting protocol where usability and ease in deployment are a priority. We introduce the notion of strict coercion resistance, to distinguish between vote-buying and coercion resistance. We propose a protocol with ballot secrecy, practical everlasting privacy, verifiability and strict coercion resistance in the re-voting setting. Coercion is mitigated via a random dummy vote padding strategy to hide voting patterns and make re-voting deniable. This allows us to build a filtering phase with linear complexity, based on zero knowledge proofs to ensure correctness while maintaining privacy of the process. Voting tokens are formed by anonymous credentials and pseudorandom identifiers, achieving practical everlasting privacy, where even if dealing with a future computationally unbounded adversary, vote intention is still hidden. It is not assumed for voters to own cryptographic keys prior to the election, nor store cryptographic material during the election. This property allows voters not only to vote multiple times, but also from different devices each time, granting the voter a vote-from-anywhere experience. This paper builds on top of the paper published in CISIS’19. In this version, we modify the filtering. Moreover, we formally define the padding technique, which allows us to perform the linear filtering scheme. Similarly we provide more details on the protocol itself and include a section of the security analysis, where we include the formal definitions of strict coercion resistance and a game based definition of practical everlasting privacy. Finally, we prove that NetVote satisfies them all.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

NetVote: A Strict-Coercion Resistance Re-Voting Based Internet Voting Scheme with Linear Filtering

et al. 2020

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“…E-voting protocols typically utilize the following cryptographic techniques: mix-net [1,3,14,16,18,19,22,29,41,45,56,57,63,66], homomorphic encryption [2,4,25,27,28,40,43,47], blind signature [12,17,44,51,54] and secret sharing based on polynomials [6,7,27,59] or simple (n, n) secret sharing [68]. Despite numerous previous work on everlasting voting privacy [10,11,27,32,33,[46][47][48][49][50]64], we note that the adversary models under which these schemes can achieve privacy could be different. For example, some systems require complex and contrasting assumptions in order to deliver privacy protections [5,29].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Koinonia

Chau

Gonsalves

et al. 2019

Proceedings of the 35th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

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Despite years of research, many existing e-voting systems do not adequately protect voting privacy. In most cases, such systems only achieve "immediate privacy", that is, they only protect voting privacy against today's adversaries, but not against a future adversary, who may possess better attack technologies like new cryptanalysis algorithms and/or quantum computers. Previous attempts at providing long-term voting privacy (dubbed "everlasting privacy" in the literature) often require additional trusts in parties that do not need to be trusted for immediate privacy.In this paper, we present a framework of adversary models regarding e-voting systems, and analyze possible threats to voting privacy under each model. Based on our analysis, we argue that secret-sharing based voting protocols offer a more natural and elegant privacy-preserving solution than their encryption-based counterparts. We thus design and implement Koinonia, a voting system that provides long-term privacy against powerful adversaries and enables anyone to verify that each ballot is well-formed and the tallying is done correctly. Our experiments show that Koinonia protects voting privacy with a reasonable performance.

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“…The KTV-Helios scheme ensures probabilistic receipt-freeness via deniable vote updating. The principle of deniable vote updating has also been proposed in other e-voting schemes [24][25][26] in order to prevent a voter from constructing receipts that show how the voter has voted. As such, the voter can cast her vote for the voting option the adversary instructs to vote for, but due to deniable vote updating the voter can change her vote without the adversary knowing it.…”

Section: Receipt-freenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Proofs for Participation Privacy, Receipt-Freeness and Ballot Privacy for the Helios Voting Scheme

Bernhard

Kulyk

Volkamer

2017

Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security

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The Helios voting scheme is well studied including formal proofs for verifiability and ballot privacy. However, depending on its version, the scheme provides either participation privacy (hiding who participated in the election) or verifiability against malicious bulletin board (preventing election manipulation by ballot stuffing), but not both at the same time. It also does not provide receipt-freeness, thus enabling vote buying by letting the voters contstruct receipts proving how they voted. Recently, an extension to Helios, further referred to as KTV-Helios, has been proposed that claims to provide these additional security properties. However, the authors of KTV-Helios did not prove their claims. Our first contribution is to provide formal definition for participation privacy and receipt-freeness, that can be applied to KTV-Helios. These definitions were used to also prove the corresponding claims of KTV-Helios. Our second contribution is to use the existing definitions of ballot privacy and verifiability against malicious bulletin board as applied to Helios in order to prove that both security properties also hold for KTV-Helios.

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Coercion-Resistant Internet Voting with Everlasting Privacy

Cited by 17 publications

References 7 publications

NetVote: A Strict-Coercion Resistance Re-Voting Based Internet Voting Scheme with Linear Filtering

NetVote: A Strict-Coercion Resistance Re-Voting Based Internet Voting Scheme with Linear Filtering

Koinonia

Security Proofs for Participation Privacy, Receipt-Freeness and Ballot Privacy for the Helios Voting Scheme

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