Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting

Abstract

In this paper we formally study important Lee et al. voting protocol.

Anonymity in Voting Revisited

“…In our definition, we deviate from the approach by Delaune et al [6]. Intuitively, receipt-freeness is achieved if a voter does not possess convincing, exclusive evidence of how she voted.…”

“…As opposed to other approaches, especially [6], the "receipt" can easily be distinguished in our model as a separate message that the voter sends to the spy. Instead of investigating whether the spy can recover the vote from forwarded messages, we judge whether the spy really knows what the voter's choice was, based on any possible receipt.…”

“…Juels et al note in [11] that receipt-freeness is not sufficient to prevent coercion in electronic elections, and they introduced the notion of coercion-resistance. This broader notion is again formalized by Delaune et al in [6].…”

“…Probabilistic privacy has been investigated in [3] (where it is called probabilistic anonymity). The notion of coercion-resistance is defined in [6]. Filling the remaining fields in the table based on these definitions is future work.…”

“…In the electronic voting community, the property expressing precisely that is usually called "privacy" instead of anonymity [6]. In voting, however, enabling privacy is not sufficient, as this does not prevent vote buying.…”