Coercion and Consent

Abstract

Most moral justifications for coercion have been based on one of two arguments: the consent of the coerced, usually understood as univariate and discrete, or the beneficial consequences of coercion; but many cases do not fit these categories. This paper proposes that consent be understood as our inferences about the agreement of agents, which vary in fine degrees with multiple underlying factors, including agent discretion, the choice set, information, and competence. Moreover, consent interacts with other moral values, including consequences, in a pluralistic system of morals that depends on the context. Examples suggest this framework can be reconciled with moral intuitions better than rival systems. (JEL: B3, D6, D7, H1, K4)

New technologies in the management of risk and violence in forensic settings

“…The introduction of this technology proved controversial at local and national levels. In correspondence 26 to our recent editorial on the subject, 27 one question of particular concern was that of consent. Patients are not obliged to wear the device without consent, with the exception of those high-risk patients requiring emergency hospital or court transfer.…”

Editorial Preface

“…Once an individual has consented, this individual may not resist the exercise of sovereign powers, whatever its content. James Konow (2014) casts doubt on this normative conclusion. As a practical matter, a government often cannot wait until all affected have explicitly consented.…”

Author's reply

“…Consent is another complex issue in psychiatry and can be defined in degrees, rather than as a binary concept. 2 It is true that patients’ decisions about consent to electronic monitoring are likely to be influenced by their wish to move more quickly towards leave and discharge. This has parallels with consent to medication and engagement in psychotherapies and occupational activities, particularly in the forensic setting.…”