Coerced to Leave: Punishment and the Surveillance of Foreign-National Offenders in the UK

Abstract

Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in London among foreign-national offenders facing deportation from the United Kingdom, this paper seeks to examine how foreign-national offenders experience and understand state policies of control. Worldwide, foreign-nationals are increasingly subject to forms of state surveillance, not just when crossing borders but also during their stay within a given state’s territory. Detention centres, weekly or monthly reporting requirements, and electronic monitoring are already common migrant surveillance strategies allied to deportation policies in many countries across the globe. These forms of state control are conceived legally as administrative practices necessary to control foreign-nationals whose status is still being adjudicated and to enforce the removal of unwanted foreign-nationals. Consequently, these strategies are not inflicted through a judicial process, even though these same practices are used within the context of penal incarceration and supervision. The lived experience of deportability and associated state surveillance highlights the punitive and coercive effects of detention and related conditions of bail. Ironically, but perhaps not unintentionally, those who are deemed a risk and subject to surveillance and banishment are therefore constantly feeling vulnerable and in need of protection. Because they do not consider themselves a risk to society, the foreign-national offenders interviewed for this study understand state surveillance not as a measure of control, but rather as punishment for wanting to stay. In their eyes, it is designed to coerce them to leave. An examination of the experiences of detention and bail reveals how such forms of surveillance work to discipline deportable bodies.

What drives ‘soft deportation’? Understanding the rise in Assisted Voluntary Return among rejected asylum seekers in the Netherlands

“…Even relatively privileged migrants conducting return visits as part of a “voluntary” transnational lifestyle (Erdal, Amjad, Bodla, & Rubab, ), may partially be pressured into transnational living by the challenges of integration (Snel, ‘t Hart, & Van Bochove, ). At the other end of the continuum, in case of “forced return”, we still find immigration detainees consenting to their deportation, while others successfully use their agency to resist it (Hasselberg, ; Lietaert, Broekaert, & Derluyn, ; Leerkes & Kox, ).…”

Pressured into a Preference to Leave? A Study on the “Specific” Deterrent Effects and Perceived Legitimacy of Immigration Detention

“…Two main types exist: (1) preadmission detention at the border, involving foreigners not admitted to the state's territory, and (2) pre‐expulsion detention of foreigners whose stay in the territory is, has, or is likely to become unauthorized. Although formally not a punishment, governments do use immigration detention to deter unwanted immigrants from the territory (Campesi , DeBono ; Hasselberg ; Kalhan ; Leerkes and Broeders ; Mainwaring ; Martin ; Pickering and Weber ). That claim rests on three main observations: (1) barring exceptions, detention occurs under regimes resembling criminal imprisonment; (2) immigration detainees tend to experience the detention as a kind of punishment, and (3) various policy makers have publicly stated that immigration detention is meant to pressure detainees into leaving.…”

“…To our knowledge, the present study is unique in addressing these questions on the basis of a substantial number of interviews conducted in detention centers. Hasselberg (: 481) conducted ethnographic research among 18 foreign‐national offenders who were facing deportation from the United Kingdom, but had been granted bail from immigration detention. Most respondents indeed perceived the detention as being designed to pressure them into leaving, and some of them—especially those who had been detained repeatedly—felt that the detention “‘break[s] one down’ to the point of agreeing to deportation.” Kalhan (), too, mentions in passing that for the United States, there is a deterrent effect in the sense that detainees may give up their claims to legal status and comply with deportation in order to end the detention.…”

“…Two main types exist: (1) preadmission detention at the border, involving foreigners not admitted to the state's territory, and (2) preexpulsion detention of foreigners whose stay in the territory is, has, or is likely to become unauthorized. Although formally not a punishment, governments do use immigration detention to deter unwanted immigrants from the territory (Campesi 2015, DeBono 2013Hasselberg 2014;Kalhan 2010;Leerkes and Broeders 2010;Mainwaring 2012;Martin 2012;Pickering and Weber 2014). That claim rests on three main observations: (1) barring…”

Devised to punish: Policing, detaining and deporting Romanians from France

“…However, the law in its current form forbids the issuing of the deportation order before the sentence is completed. Hasselberg (2014) and Coutin (2015) remark on a shift towards the normalization of deportation as an appropriate response to crime. In an interview with a police liaison officer, deportation as a punishment tool became visible:…”