Coding Constructions for Blacklisting Problems without Computational Assumptions

Kumar, Ravi; Rajagopalan, Sridhar; Sahai, Amit

doi:10.1007/3-540-48405-1_38

Cited by 127 publications

(87 citation statements)

References 22 publications

(43 reference statements)

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“…The idea above can be further extended to give a fully leakage resilient t-time signature scheme using cover-free families. We follow the definition of [20].…”

Section: A Fully Leakage-resilient One-time Signature Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

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Signature Schemes with Bounded Leakage Resilience

Katz

Vaikuntanathan²

2009

Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2009

174

189

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A leakage-resilient cryptosystem remains secure even if arbitrary, but bounded, information about the secret key (or possibly other internal state information) is leaked to an adversary. Denote the length of the secret key by n. We show a signature scheme tolerating (optimal) leakage of up to n − n ǫ bits of information about the secret key, and a more efficient one-time signature scheme that tolerates leakage of ( 1 4 − ǫ) · n bits of information about the signer's entire state. The latter construction extends to give a leakage-resilient t-time signature scheme. All these constructions are in the standard model under general assumptions.

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“…The idea above can be further extended to give a fully leakage resilient t-time signature scheme using cover-free families. We follow the definition of [20].…”

Section: A Fully Leakage-resilient One-time Signature Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

“…, S t ∈ S it holds that S \ ∪ t i=1 S i ≥ |S|/2. ♦ Kumar et al [20] show an explicit construction that, for any t and k, yields a (t, 1 2 )-cover free family S = {S 1 , . .…”

Section: A Fully Leakage-resilient One-time Signature Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

Signature Schemes with Bounded Leakage Resilience

Katz

Vaikuntanathan²

2009

Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2009

174

189

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Kumar et al [13] proposed revocation methods using error correcting codes. In their methods only non-revoked receivers can correct the error in the broadcast message and retrieve the secret information.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Revocation Scheme with Minimal Storage at Receivers

Asano

2002

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. A revocation or a broadcast encryption technology allows a sender to transmit information securely over a broadcast channel to a select group of receivers excluding some revoked receivers. In this paper we propose two efficient revocation methods which are suitable for stateless receivers. The proposed methods use an a-ary key tree structure and require at most r log (N/r) log a + 1 ciphertexts broadcast. Our Method 1 requires only one key to be stored and O 2 a log 5 N log a computational overhead at a receiver, whereas Method 2 requires log N log a keys and O (2 a ) computational overhead, where N and r respectively denote the total number of receivers and the number of revoked receivers. Our methods are very efficient with respect to the number of keys each receiver stores, especially Method 1 minimizes it.

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“…The existence of such cover free subsets was proven by D'yachkov et al [14], where the fact that we can construct them in polynomial time was proven by Kumar et al [23].…”

Section: S(e|mentioning

confidence: 91%

On the Instantiability of Hash-and-Sign RSA Signatures

Dodis

Haitner

Tentes

2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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The hash-and-sign RSA signature is one of the most elegant and well known signatures schemes, extensively used in a wide variety of cryptographic applications. Unfortunately, the only existing analysis of this popular signature scheme is in the random oracle model, where the resulting idealized signature is known as the RSA Full Domain Hash signature scheme (RSA-FDH). In fact, prior work has shown several "uninstantiability" results for various abstractions of RSA-FDH, where the RSA function was replaced by a family of trapdoor random permutations, or the hash function instantiating the random oracle could not be keyed. These abstractions, however, do not allow the reduction and the hash function instantiation to use the algebraic properties of RSA function, such as the multiplicative group structure of Z * n . In contrast, the multiplicative property of the RSA function is critically used in many standard model analyses of various RSA-based schemes.Motivated by closing this gap, we consider the setting where the RSA function representation is generic (i.e., black-box) but multiplicative, whereas the hash function itself is in the standard model, and can be keyed and exploit the multiplicative properties of the RSA function. This setting abstracts all known techniques for designing provably secure RSA-based signatures in the standard model, and aims to address the main limitations of prior uninstantiability results. Unfortunately, we show that it is still impossible to reduce the security of RSA-FDH to any natural assumption even in our model. Thus, our result suggests that in order to prove the security of a given instantiation of RSA-FDH, one should use a non-black box security proof, or use specific properties of the RSA group that are not captured by its multiplicative structure alone. We complement our negative result with a positive result, showing that the RSA-FDH signatures can be proven secure under the standard RSA assumption, provided that the number of signing queries is a-priori bounded.

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Coding Constructions for Blacklisting Problems without Computational Assumptions

Cited by 127 publications

References 22 publications

Signature Schemes with Bounded Leakage Resilience

Signature Schemes with Bounded Leakage Resilience

A Revocation Scheme with Minimal Storage at Receivers

On the Instantiability of Hash-and-Sign RSA Signatures

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