Codecision since Amsterdam: a laboratory for institutional innovation and change

Abstract

Codecision has dramatically increased the level of interaction and interdependence between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Under Maastricht the two institutions were able to agree on a set of shared norms and rules to manage the interdependence arising from the conciliation procedure. The expansion and simplification of codecision under Amsterdam since May 1999 has started to generate significant strains on the further development of those norms and rules. In particular, it has provoked tension between the competing claims of efficiency and democracy in the framing of legislation. The way in which this is resolved will contribute substantially to the future institutional architecture of the EU.

The culture of trilogues

“…There were indications-but little concrete evidence-that Council had developed elaborate mechanisms of internal coordination, which enabled the Presidency to better aggregate the positions of the national delegations. By contrast, Parliament presented a rather sorry picture, as the increasing role of core trilogue players in making informal deals undercut the ability of EP committees to aggregate internal preferences (Shackleton and Raunio 2003).…”

“…They brought informal practices to the analytic center of co-decision research (Shackleton 2000) and conceptualized trilogues as a "new mechanism" devised by the two branches of the legislature to manage their interdependence (Shackleton and Raunio, 2003). These early accounts have structured the subsequent debate around three distinct though interrelated themes of research: the institutional variety of trilogues; their power-distributive implications; and finally their normative implications.…”

“…Trilogues have no reference in the EU treaties, but have developed in practice from the need of the two branches of the legislature, The Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers -CoM) and European Parliament (EP), to manage their interdependence (Shackleton and Raunio, 2003). Trilogues include features that are problematic from a democratic perspective, in that they are secluded and involve a restricted number of participants selected according to unclear criteria, and produce intermediary outcomes that have to be sanctioned by formal decision-making processes Reh et al 2013).…”

The Informal Politics of Codecision: Introducing a New Data Set on Early Agreements in the European Union

“…Inside Parliament, criticism has been voiced since the early 2000s (Imbeni et al 2001), and the 2009 and 2012 reforms of the EP's Rules of Procedure saw high degrees of conflict over both the desirability and regulation of early conclusion 2012a). Similarly, praise for the efficiency of EAs notwithstanding (Jacqué 2008), scholars, practitioners and national parliaments have criticised their lack of inclusiveness, transparency and open deliberation (Bunyan 2007;House of Lords 2009;Huber and Shackleton 2013;Lord 2013;Shackleton and Raunio 2003;Stie 2013). Finally, given the wider trend towards informalisation and seclusion in both domestic and global governance (Bedock et al 2012;Daase 2009), codecision in the Fifth and Sixth EP can serve as an ideal test case for the growing number of scholars with an interest in informal governance (Christiansen and Neuhold 2012).…”

Out of Time? National Parliaments and Early Decision-Making in the European Union

“…Early agreements, however, have implications beyond efficiency gains. Compromises are negotiated in informal settings and imply an additional level in the delegation chain of EU policy making, where the Council presidency and the rapporteur for the European Parliament become the entrusted negotiators (Shackleton & Raunio 2003;Farrel & Héritier 2004;Rasmussen & Shackleton 2005;Rasmussen 2011). Such turn towards greater informalization of the EU decisionmaking process is likely to have considerable implications for national parliaments' ability to scrutinize and influence EU affairs.…”