1960
DOI: 10.2307/2785888
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Coalitions in the Triad: Critique and Experiment

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Cited by 109 publications
(89 citation statements)
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“…Some of the early experiments were conducted by political scientists (Laing & Morrison, 1973;Riker, 1971Riker, , 1972, psychologists (Kelley & Arrowood, 1960;Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957), sociologists (Gamson, 1961(Gamson, , 1964, economists (Murnighan & Roth, 1977, 1978, and game theoreticians (Kalisch et al, 1954: Maschler, 1965). Many of the early studies focused on psychological aspects of coalition formation behavior, whereas others (e.g., Kalisch et al, 1954;Maschler, 1965) were designed to test theoretical predictions of coalition formation modeled as games in characteristic function form (see Kahan & Rapoport, 1984, for a review of this early experimental literature).…”
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confidence: 99%
“…Some of the early experiments were conducted by political scientists (Laing & Morrison, 1973;Riker, 1971Riker, , 1972, psychologists (Kelley & Arrowood, 1960;Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957), sociologists (Gamson, 1961(Gamson, , 1964, economists (Murnighan & Roth, 1977, 1978, and game theoreticians (Kalisch et al, 1954: Maschler, 1965). Many of the early studies focused on psychological aspects of coalition formation behavior, whereas others (e.g., Kalisch et al, 1954;Maschler, 1965) were designed to test theoretical predictions of coalition formation modeled as games in characteristic function form (see Kahan & Rapoport, 1984, for a review of this early experimental literature).…”
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confidence: 99%
“…However, the two weaker players can readily perceive themselves as having a disadvantage relative to the stronger ones and therefore may decide to ally in order to overcome the greater power of the stronger member. Kelley and Arrowood (1960) demonstrated that this outcome is especially likely when each player actually gains by the power he holds. For instances if players are paid commensurately with their strength, but can gain additional rewd by alliance, then the two weaker players are likely to establish a coalition.…”
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confidence: 99%
“…191-219. ) Particularly influential has been the formulation of intra-triad power patterns presented by Caplow (1956;, which suggests that individuals reach agreements that correspond to their relative atrength--eithar as it lo perceived (Vinacke, 1962) or as it exists in actual fact (Kelley, and Arrowood, 1960. ) Since these findings are essential to the plan of the present experiment, it is well to describe at this point how intra-triad pt-,et relationships may vary.…”
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confidence: 99%
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“…In an early theoretical exposition Simmel (1902) contrasted dyads with triads, noting that the third party affords an au dience for the other two; each person may be directly and/or indirectly related to each of the others; also coalescence and cleavages of subgroups are possible (cf., Caplow, 1959;Kelley & Arrowood, 1960). In comparison to dyads, triads make available additional sources of reinforcement: joint cost-cutting, -joint consumption, mutual facilitation of enjoyment, emergent products, and seguential patterns of in terdependence (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%