Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation

Ehlers, Lars

doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2813

Cited by 81 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…There is some interesting literature in the design of GSP mechanisms for assignment problems of heterogeneous goods when money is not available (Ehlers[2002], Ehlers et al[2003], Papai [2000Papai [ , 2001 and Svensson et al[2002]). Unfortunately, this literature usually charac-terizes mechanisms with poor equity properties (e.g.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…When the cost function is submodular (concave), cross-monotonic mechanisms are characterized by GSP , budget balance, voluntary participation, nonnegative transfers and strong consumer sovereignty. 4 Roughgarden et al [2006a, 2006b], Pa'l et al [2003] and Immorlica et al[2005] consider cross-monotonic mechanisms when the cost function is not submodular. Roughgarden et al [2006] uses submodular cross-monotonic mechanisms to approximate budget balance when the actual cost function is not submodular.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences

Juárez

2013

Games and Economic Behavior

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Summary. Every agent reports his willingness to pay for one unit of good. A mechanism allocates goods and cost shares to some agents. We characterize the group strategyproof (GSP ) mechanisms under two alternative continuity conditions interpreted as tie-breaking rules. With the maximalist rule (M AX) an indifferent agent is always served. With the minimalist rule (M IN ) an indifferent agent does not get a unit of good.GSP and M AX characterize the cross-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever symmetry is required. On the other hand, GSP and M IN characterize the sequential mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever there is scarcity of the good.Our results are independent of an underlying cost function; they unify and strengthen earlier results for particular classes of cost functions.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences

Juárez

2013

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…3 The search for "good" mechanisms is the subject of many recent contributions, but most of them deal with the house allocation model where exactly one object of each type is available (e.g., Ehlers, 2002;Klaus, 2006, 2007;Kesten, 2009;Pápai, 2000). In most papers that study the allocation of indivisible objects with capacity constraints, externally prescribed priorities are also specified; the corresponding class of problems is usually referred to as "school choice problems" or "student placement problems" (see Sönmez andÜnver, 2011, for a recent survey).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities

Ehlers

Klaus

2014

Mathematics of OR

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In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important market design problems, the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA-)mechanism with responsive strict priorities performs well and economists have successfully implemented DA-mechanisms or slight variants thereof. We show that almost all real-life mechanisms used in such environments-including the large classes of priority mechanisms and linear programming mechanisms-satisfy a set of simple and intuitive properties. Once we add strategy-proofness to these properties, DA-mechanisms are the only ones surviving. In market design problems that are based on weak priorities (like school choice), generally multiple tie-breaking (MTB) procedures are used and then a mechanism is implemented with the obtained strict priorities. By adding stability with respect to the weak priorities, we establish the first normative foundation for MTB-DA-mechanisms that are used in NYC. JEL Classification: D63, D70

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“…In their study, private 1 ownership of the objects was presumed and the core of the economy was analyzed. More recently, a modification of this allocation problem, where the objects are regarded as a social endowment, has received considerable attention, see, e.g., Sönmez (1999,2003), Ehlers (2002), Pápai (2000) and Svensson (1999). Taking social endowments as a point of departure also reflects many real-life allocation problems, for example, housing allocation among students on college campuses and assignment of public schools to children.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Strategy-proofness has been investigated earlier by, e.g., Sönmez (1999,2003), Ehlers (2002), Pápai (2000) and Svensson (1999), when no monetary transfers are allowed, and by, e.g., Demange and Gale (1985) and Tadenuma and Thomson (1995), when monetary transfers are allowed, but when no exogenous restrictions are imposed on the monetary compensations. In recent papers by Anderson and Svensson (2006), Sun and Yang (2003) and Svensson (2006), an allocation problem, where the monetary transfers are restricted by an upper compensation limit is analyzed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness

Andersson

Svensson

2007

Rev. Econ. Design

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This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and when only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair allocation not generally is guaranteed due the the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. We define an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrate that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, it is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that implements a weakly fair allocation.JEL Classification: C71; C78; D63; D71; D78.

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Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation

Cited by 81 publications

References 15 publications

Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences

Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences

Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities

Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness

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