Coalitional games with veto players: Consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes

Arin, Javier; Feltkamp, Vincent

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.04.003

Cited by 3 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 14 publications

(17 reference statements)

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“…2 Arin and Feltkamp (1997) show that the kernel is a single point for vetorich games. In other words, the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) and the kernel coincide.…”

Section: Tu Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2.2 One-period bargaining (Arin and Feltkamp, 2007) Given a veto balanced game (N; v) where player 1 is a veto player and an order on the set of the remaining players, we will de…ne an extensive-form game associated to the TU game and denote it by G(N; v). The game has n stages and in each stage only one player takes an action.…”

Section: Tu Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If a player, say i; accepts the proposal x and for the next stage the proposal x s coincides with the proposal at s 1; that is x s 1 : If player i rejects the proposal, this rejection is understood as an appeal for the bilateral fairness principle to be enforced. A two-person TU game is constructed by applying the de…nition of the Davis-Maschler reduced game 3 on the set f1; ig given x s 1 , and player i receives as payo¤ the restricted standard solution 4 of this 2 An equivalent de…nition of the kernel is based on the mirror concept of f ij , which is the surplus of i against j at x (terminology of Maschler, 1992), s ij (x) := max S:i2S N nfjg fv(S) x(S)g. The kernel is the set of imputations such that s ij (x) > s ji (x) implies x j = v(j). We found it more convenient to work with f ij (:) rather than s ij (:).…”

Section: Tu Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Using this bilateral principle, Arin and Feltkamp (2007) studied the bargaining procedure in another class of games with a distinguished player, namely games with a veto player. A veto player is a player whose cooperation is essential in order for a coalition to generate value.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Examples include a production economy with one landowner and many landless peasants (Shapley and Shubik (1967)), an innovator trading information about a technological innovation with several producers (Muto (1986), Muto et al (1989), Driessen et al (1992)) and hierarchical situations where a top player's permission is necessary in order for a project to be developed (Gilles et al 1992). Arin and Feltkamp (2007) found that the equilibria of this bargaining procedure are not always e¢ cient: the proposer may be strictly better-o¤ by proposing an allocation that does not exhaust the total available payo¤.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players

2015

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This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Arin and Feltkamp (J Math Econ 43:855-870, 2007), which is based on Dagan et al. (Games Econ Behav 18:55-72, 1997). A distinguished player makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ‡ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (Eur J Oper Res 216:208-213, 2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are fully rational, the serial rule Dpto. Ftos. A. Económico I, University of the Basque Country, L. Agirre 83,

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“…2 Arin and Feltkamp (1997) show that the kernel is a single point for vetorich games. In other words, the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) and the kernel coincide.…”

Section: Tu Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Tu Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Tu Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players

2015

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A Dynamic Multi-Player Bargaining Game with Veto Players

Liu

Wang

2020

J Syst Sci Complex

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Coalitional Games with Veto Players: Myopic and Rational Behavior

2012

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper studies a noncooperative allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject. We present a model where the proposer can make sequential proposals over n periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are rational, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players must respond to the proposal after weaker ones. Terms of use: Documents in

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Coalitional games with veto players: Consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes

Cited by 3 publications

References 14 publications

A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players

A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players

A Dynamic Multi-Player Bargaining Game with Veto Players

Coalitional Games with Veto Players: Myopic and Rational Behavior

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