Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies

Abstract

We study the winning subcoalitions to be self-enforcing. This is most simply illustrated by the following example: with "majority rule," two-person coalitions are generically not self-enforcing and consequently, three-person coalitions are self-enforcing (unless one player is disproportionately powerful). We also characterize the structure of ruling coalitions. For example, we determine the conditions under which ruling coalitions are robust to small changes in the distribution of power and when they are fragile. We also show that when the distribution of power across individuals is relatively equal and there is majoritarian voting, only certain sizes of coalitions (e.g., with "majority rule," coalitions of size 3, 7, 15, 31, etc.) can be the ruling coalition.

Political leader survival: does competence matter?

“…For more details, see Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003). 4 Questions on how w and s are determined have been analyzed by Ray and Vohra (1999), Konishi and Ray (2003), Acemoglu et al (2008), and others. These studies look at the dynamics in winning coalition formation.…”

Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships

“…The authors assume that coalescing agents that gather sufficient power can eliminate potential opponents forever and share the society's rents among themselves. We diverge in two respects from Acemoglu et al (2008). Notice first that patron-client relationships cannot be analyzed in their setting since the necessary hierarchy among the ruling coalition members constitutes a black box.…”

“…As Acemoglu et al (2008), we allow each agent to be heterogeneously endowed in power and we derive results regarding the equilibrium cooptation price, the size of the clientele, but also regarding the identity of the clients. One of the central results of our paper echoes the above finding of Bertocchi and Spagat (2001).…”

“…Acemoglu et al (2008) lift this hypothesis and study the endogenous formation of ruling coalitions. The authors assume that coalescing agents that gather sufficient power can eliminate potential opponents forever and share the society's rents among themselves.…”

“…Lifting the homogeneity assumption, however, widens the strategy set of the ruler. Acemoglu et al (2008) recognize the importance of agents being heterogeneous in power, and analyze the endogenous formation of the ruling coalition. This approach diverges from the patron-client setting we have described, where a monopolistic ruler purchases clients to avert turmoil.…”