Coalition and Group Announcement Logic

Abstract

Dynamic epistemic logics which model abilities of agents to make various announcements and influence each other's knowledge have been studied extensively in recent years. Two notable examples of such logics are Group Announcement Logic and Coalition Announcement Logic. They allow us to reason about what groups of agents can achieve through joint announcements in non-competitive and competitive environments. In this paper, we consider a combination of these logics -- Coalition and Group Announcement Logic and provide its complete axiomatisation. Moreover, we partially answer the question of how group and coalition announcement operators interact, and settle some other open problems.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825

An epistemic logic of preferences

“…Ågotnes et al (2010) propose a group announcement modality G ϕ that means "group G can announce certain facts, individually known to members of the group, after which statement ϕ will be true". Galimullin and Alechina (2017) study a modality G ϕ that states "ϕ will become true after an announcement by group G and will remain true after further announcements made by agents outside of group G".…”

Strategic Knowledge Acquisition

“…It uses modality S C φ that stands for "there is a strategy of coalition C that guarantees φ". His approach has been widely studied by others [4,21,22]. Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman introduced Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (ATL) that combines temporal and coalition modalities [5].…”

Strategic coalitions in stochastic games

“…Pauly proved the completeness of the basic logic of coalition power. His approach has been widely studied in the literature [3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14].…”