This paper concerns coordination of enterprise decisions such as suppliers and components selection, pricing and inventory in a multi-level supply chain composed of multiple suppliers, a single manufacturer and multiple retailers. The problem is modeled as a three-level dynamic non-cooperative game. Analytical and computational methods are developed to determine the Nash equilibrium of the game. Finally, a numerical study in computer industry is conducted to understand the influence of the market scale parameter and the components selection strategy on the optimal decisions and profits of the supply chain as well as its constituent members. Several research findings have been obtained.components selection decisions to maximize his net profit. The retailers' problem will focus on the replenishment cycles and retail prices for the products.We describe CSCSPI problem as a three-level dynamic non-cooperative game with respect to the overall supply chain. The suppliers formulate the bottom-level non-cooperative simultaneous sub-game and at the same time as a whole play the middle-level non-cooperative simultaneous sub-game with the manufacturer. The suppliers and the manufacturer also being a group formulate the top-level non-cooperative simultaneous whole game with the retailers. Once the whole game settles an equilibrium solution, none of the any chain members is able to improve its payoff (i.e. profits) by acting unilaterally without degrading the performance of other players. We propose both analytical and computational methods to obtain the Nash equilibrium of this game.The game model and the proposed solution algorithm constitute a powerful decision support for solving the CSCSPI problem. Its use is demonstrated and tested through a numerical example. The impacts of the market scale parameter and components selection on the decisions and profits of all the chain members are also investigated.This paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a brief review of the literature related to pricing and inventory coordination, product family design, Game Theory for supply chain coordination. In Section 3, we give the problem description and some notations. We formulate the mathematical model of the CSCSPI problem in Section 4. Section 5 proposes the analytical and computational methods used to solve the CSCSPI problem in Section 4. In Section 6, a numerical study and the influence of market scale parameter and the components selection strategy have been presented. Finally, this paper concludes in Section 7 with some limitations and suggestions for further work.
Literature reviewPricing, inventory decisions, and product family design and platform products development, have been extensively studied in supply chain coordination. Although the three areas are closely interrelated with each other, they are rarely been studied in an integrated, systematic manner. Recently, Game Theory (GT) has also been applied to analyze supply chain coordination problem. This section will briefly review a few representative work...