Co-operation and defection: Playing the field and the ESS

Motro, Uzi

doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80358-3

Cited by 76 publications

(114 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…For example, defending a resource against a common intruder can reduce social conflict even if group sizes increase [82]. Group size is also essential in foraging [83] and variations may promote more egalitarian outcomes in the tragedy of the commune [84,85].…”

Section: Fig 6 Eco-evolutionary Dynamics Under Environmental Fluctumentioning

confidence: 99%

Eco-evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas

Gokhale

Hauert

2016

Theoretical Population Biology

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Social dilemmas are an integral part of social interactions. Cooperative actions, ranging from secreting extra-cellular products in microbial populations to donating blood in humans, are costly to the actor and hence create an incentive to shirk and avoid the costs. Nevertheless, cooperation is ubiquitous in nature. Both costs and benefits often depend non-linearly on the number and types of individuals involved -as captured by idioms such as 'too many cooks spoil the broth' where additional contributions are discounted, or 'two heads are better than one' where cooperators synergistically enhance the group benefit. Interaction group sizes may depend on the size of the population and hence on ecological processes. This results in feedback mechanisms between ecological and evolutionary processes, which jointly affect and determine the evolutionary trajectory. Only recently combined eco-evolutionary processes became experimentally tractable in microbial social dilemmas. Here we analyse the evolutionary dynamics of non-linear social dilemmas in settings where the population fluctuates in size and the environment changes over time. In particular, cooperation is often supported and maintained at high densities through ecological fluctuations. Moreover, we find that the combination of the two processes routinely reveals highly complex dynamics, which suggests common occurrence in nature.

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Section: Fig 6 Eco-evolutionary Dynamics Under Environmental Fluctumentioning

confidence: 99%

Eco-evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas

Gokhale

Hauert

2016

Theoretical Population Biology

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“…While evolutionary models have generally assumed a linear or a step benefit function (Archetti, 2009a,b), or synergistic and saturating benefits (Motro, 1991;Hauert et al, 2006), games with more complex non-linear benefits, such as the benefits likely to arise in the case of glycolysis, cannot be solved using current standard methods. As a result, while we have some intuition of the results for sigmoid benefits Scheuring, 2011, 2012) a full analytical account of the problem of non-linear public goods has been so far beyond the reach of evolutionary game theory (but see Archetti, 2013).…”

Section: Glycolysis As a Public Goods Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary dynamics of the Warburg effect: Glycolysis as a collective action problem among cancer cells

Archetti

2014

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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The upregulation of glycolysis in tumors is common even when oxygen is not limiting. The adaptive value of this "Warburg effect" is unclear. Glycolysis is costly for a cell but the ensuing acidity is beneficial for the tumor. A collective action problem among cancer cells arises. Game theory shows that the acidity induced by glycolysis can explain the Warburg effect. a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c tThe upregulation of glycolysis in cancer cells (the "Warburg effect") is common and has implications for prognosis and treatment. As it is energetically inefficient under adequate oxygen supply, its adaptive value for a tumor remains unclear. It has been suggested that the acidity produced by glycolysis is beneficial for cancer cells because it promotes proliferation against normal cells. Current models of this acid-mediated tumor invasion hypothesis, however, do not account for increased glycolysis under nonlimiting oxygen concentrations and therefore do not fully explain the Warburg effect. Here I show that the Warburg effect can be explained as a form of cooperation among cancer cells, in which the products of glycolysis act as a public good, even when oxygen supply is high enough to make glycolysis energetically inefficient. A multiplayer game with non-linear, non-monotonic payoff functions that models the benefits of the acidity induced by glycolysis reveals that clonal selection can stabilize glycolysis even when energetically costly, that is, under non-limiting oxygen concentration. Characterizing the evolutionary dynamics of glycolysis reveals cases in which anti-cancer therapies that rely on the modification of acidity can be effective.

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“…As shown in the vast literature on nonlinear public goods games (e.g., Dugatkin, 1990;Motro, 1991;Bach et al, 2006;Hauert et al, 2006;Cuesta et al, 2008;Pacheco et al, 2009;Archetti and Scheuring, 2011) cooperative behavior may arise in the evolutionary solution of such games even when other mechanisms potentially promoting cooperation such as relatedness (Eshel and Motro, 1988;Archetti, 2009;Peña et al, 2015) and reciprocity in repeated interactions (Boyd and Richerson, 1988;Hilbe et al, 2014) are absent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, we build on results obtained in Motro (1991) and Peña et al (2014) to identify conditions on the payoff structure of the game which are sufficient to infer those shape properties of the gain function that are required to identify the variability effects we are interested in (Lemmas 1 and 2). These results dispense with the need to explicitly calculate the gain function (i.e., the difference in expected payoff between the two strategies) whenever the payoff structure of the game satisfies the relevant conditions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This paper has followed Peña (2012) in investigating the evolutionary consequences of variation in group size using the replicator dynamics of two-strategy multiplayer games. While this is a common approach is the literature on collective action problems (Motro, 1991;Bach et al, 2006;Peña et al, 2014), alternative approaches are possible. In particular, the very same question we are interested in has been explored by Brännström et al (2011) in the framework of continuous strategies and adaptive dynamics (Metz et al, 1996).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Variability in group size and the evolution of collective action

Peña

Nöldeke

2016

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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Models of the evolution of collective action typically assume that interactions occur in groups of identical size. In contrast, social interactions between animals occur in groups of widely dispersed size. This article models collective action problems as two-strategy multiplayer games and studies the effect of variability in group size on the evolution of cooperative behavior under the replicator dynamics. The analysis identifies elementary conditions on the payoff structure of the game implying that the evolution of cooperative behavior is promoted or inhibited when the group size experienced by a focal player is more or less variable. Similar but more stringent conditions are applicable when the confounding effect of size-biased sampling, which causes the group-size distribution experienced by a focal player to differ from the statistical distribution of group sizes, is taken into account.

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Co-operation and defection: Playing the field and the ESS

Cited by 76 publications

References 11 publications

Eco-evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas

Eco-evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas

Evolutionary dynamics of the Warburg effect: Glycolysis as a collective action problem among cancer cells

Variability in group size and the evolution of collective action

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