2017
DOI: 10.1007/s12116-017-9250-1
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Co-Investment and Clientelism as Informal Institutions: Beyond ‘Good Enough’ Property Rights Protection

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Cited by 11 publications
(7 citation statements)
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References 58 publications
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“…Furthermore, policies also indicate land-use planning and allocation, and permits and licensing being critical drivers of oil palm plantation expansion. Lack of participation and clarity in land-use planning and allocation processes has given rise to various tenurial problems, such as unclear land rights, and overlapping and/or mutual land claims between actors (Abram et al 2017, Andrianto et al 2019, Hamilton-Hart 2017a, Juniyanti et al 2021). Cases of misalignment between central and local governments have been identified in permit and licensing processes.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, policies also indicate land-use planning and allocation, and permits and licensing being critical drivers of oil palm plantation expansion. Lack of participation and clarity in land-use planning and allocation processes has given rise to various tenurial problems, such as unclear land rights, and overlapping and/or mutual land claims between actors (Abram et al 2017, Andrianto et al 2019, Hamilton-Hart 2017a, Juniyanti et al 2021). Cases of misalignment between central and local governments have been identified in permit and licensing processes.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This contribution serves as a reminder that the institutional attributes and capacities of states are not uniform, but can differ by sector (e.g. Kim, 2019) and, particularly in partially decentralized systems such as China and Indonesia, by locality (Hamilton-Hart & Palmer, 2017;Zhang & Zhu, 2018). Thurbon and Weiss (2020) study of Korea's robotics industry also shows ongoing state activity for developmental purposes that is meaningfully distinguished from the 'market-supporting' interventions of regulatory states.…”
Section: Statesmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…In application, however, both the institutions themselves and their hypothesized antecedents are elastic. 'Secure' property rights cover a wide range of experiences in property protection, including substantial insecurity for some on the road to capitalist transitions (Hamilton-Hart & Palmer, 2017). Similarly, when commonly used proxies for institutions such as 'the rule of law' are disaggregated, much of the explanatory force attached to the rule of law disappears in developing country contexts in favor of more basic protections such as control of crime (Haggard & Tiede, 2011).…”
Section: Statesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A focus on the business-government relationship calls for greater attention to the mediating institutions that prescribe de facto rules for interaction between public and private sectors (Doner, 2009). Characteristics of state institutions (for example, the degree of effective hierarchical discipline) incentivize different types of interaction with private actors (personalized and informal, for example, or collective and formalized), with predictable consequences for the discipline and consistency of policy implementation (Davidson, 2015;Hamilton-Hart and Palmer, 2017). The organization of private sector actors also matters: the readiness of firms to organize through business associations or interfirm group ties varies widely, affecting the firms' ability to provide common-good functions independently and enabling collective interactions with government actors (Doner and Schneider, 2000;Noble, 1998;Wade, 2018).…”
Section: Institutions and Collective Action In Taiwan's Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Firms can reassure partners who are asked to make specific, long-term commitments through mechanisms such as joint venture structures that provide mutual reassurance (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). A government which needs to offer private investors sufficient reassurance that it will not expropriate or over-tax private investment returns may introduce 'self-binding' restraints or engage in co-investment strategies (Hamilton-Hart and Palmer, 2017;North and Weingast, 1989).…”
Section: Institutions and Collective Action In Taiwan's Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%