2015
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2577535
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Closing Governance Gaps in Bangladesh's Garment Industry The Power and Limitations of Private Governance Schemes

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Cited by 20 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…Moreover, it is important to point out that a significant number of garment factories in Bangladesh still operate below the radar of any international safety initiative. Several pressing problems, such as low wages and low environmental standards in the Bangladeshi garment sector, also remain largely unaddressed so far (Baumann-Pauly et al, 2015). This illustrative analysis of the Accord clearly shows several normative shortcomings of the Accord process: First, the Accord failed to engage with important affected stakeholders, such as factory owners and government representatives from Bangladesh, leaving the initiative in a precarious situation, as important local stakeholders have raised doubts about the legitimacy and legality of the Accord.…”
Section: : Finding Solutionsmentioning
confidence: 97%
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“…Moreover, it is important to point out that a significant number of garment factories in Bangladesh still operate below the radar of any international safety initiative. Several pressing problems, such as low wages and low environmental standards in the Bangladeshi garment sector, also remain largely unaddressed so far (Baumann-Pauly et al, 2015). This illustrative analysis of the Accord clearly shows several normative shortcomings of the Accord process: First, the Accord failed to engage with important affected stakeholders, such as factory owners and government representatives from Bangladesh, leaving the initiative in a precarious situation, as important local stakeholders have raised doubts about the legitimacy and legality of the Accord.…”
Section: : Finding Solutionsmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Thus, the Accord exemplifies the kind of stakeholder value conflict that our framework aims to address. Second, the Accord has received great attention by scholars, practitioners, and the media over the past years resulting in a rich body of both empirical and conceptual academic papers (Baumann-Pauly, Labowitz, & Banerjee, 2015;Donaghey & Reinecke, 2017;Huber & Schormair, 2019;Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015), independent research reports (Barrett, Baumann-Pauly, & Gu, 2018;Baumann-Pauly et al, 2015), media coverage (Taeubner, 2013), and stakeholder publications (CCC, 2013; IndustriAll Global Union, 2017). Third, the Accord is considered a leading MSI in terms of transparency providing detailed insights into internal governance processes, factory audits, and performance data on its website (Accord, 2018).…”
Section: Accommodating Conflicting Stakeholder Valuementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…While checklists and audits are certainly quicker, they lack the essential human rights lens that pinpoints issues not often predicted by pre-written checklists. 20 Additionally, HRRAs allow the flexibility to go beyond the pre-scripted audits that have systematically failed to identify human rights shortcomings, 14 including the recent revelations of Syrian children sewing garments for certain UK brands. 21 The field component of HRRA builds on human rights engagement methodologies, including semi-structured interviews with vulnerable populations, gaining perspectives that are not often shared by workers on the factory floor or community members in a company meeting.…”
Section: Outcomes: What Was Done About Business Relationshipsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Numerous widely publicized factory disasters captured public attention and revealed poor working conditions among low‐cost factories that serve consumer commodity markets. The Rana Plaza factory collapse, which symbolizes the negative outcomes of supply chain risk in Bangladesh, is commonly attributed to inadequate government regulation and ongoing cost pressure from Western buyers (Alamgir & Banerjee, 2018; Anner, 2017; Anner & Hossain., 2014; Baumann‐Pauly et al, 2015). Efforts to prevent recurring labor violations in Bangladesh are somewhat effective in the realm of building safety, but largely ignore individual worker safety and adequate wage provisions (Anner, 2018).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%