Close-call counterfactuals and belief-system defenses: I was not almost wrong but I was almost right.

Abstract

Drawing on samples of professional observers of world politics, this article explores the interrelations among cognitive style, theoretical outlook, and reactions to close-call counterfactuals. Study 1 demonstrated that experts (especially high scorers on a composite measure of need for closure and simplicity) rejected close-call counterfactuals that redirected history when these counterfactuals undermined a preferred framework for understanding the past (the "I-was-not-almost-wrong" defense). Study 2 demonstrated that experts (especially high scorers on need for closure and simplicity) embraced close-call counterfactuals that redirected history when these counterfactuals protected conditional forecasts from refutation (the predicted outcome nearly occurred-so "I was almost right"). The article concludes by considering the radically different normative value spins that can be placed on willingness to entertain close-call counterfactuals,

When overconfidence is revealed to others: Testing the status-enhancement theory of overconfidence

“…Because individuals who seek status may be more likely to attain their goals when they display confidence, over time, the positive reinforcement of this behavior may lead status-seeking individuals to develop habits of thinking and acting confidently, even when their skills cannot justify such confidence (Radzevick & Moore, 2011). This could provide one explanation for why experts update their judgments less often and more slowly than one might expect (Tetlock, 1998;Tetlock, 2005). Like other individuals seeking status advancement through their careers (Wrzesniewski, McCauley, Rozin, & Schwartz, 1997) experts may find it expedient to exhibit overconfidence in their task abilities.…”

The psychology of intelligence analysis: Drivers of prediction accuracy in world politics.

“…Previous research has found that experts with a greater need for closure reject counterfactual scenarios that prove their theories wrong while embracing counterfactual scenarios that prove their theories right (Tetlock, 1998), a form of motivated reasoning that is likely to hinder attempts to accurately model uncertainty in the real world.…”

From what might have been to what must have been: Counterfactual thinking creates meaning.

“…Our argument here applies to how ordinary people make sense of their own life histories, and not necessarily to how professionals make sense of complex causal sequences far removed from their everyday lives. system defense among political experts committed to the theoretical view that certain things had to happen (Tetlock, 1998). However, in the construction of personal life narratives, individuals have wide latitude to choose which events are pivotal (and how to interpret them), making veridicality an elusive notion.…”