Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited

Abstract

For proponents of the view that anthropogenic climate change will become a 'threat multiplier' for instability in the decades ahead, the Syrian civil war has become a recurring reference point, providing apparently compelling evidence that such conflict effects are already with us. According to this view, human-induced climatic change was a contributory factor in the extreme drought experienced within Syria prior to its civil war; this drought in turn led to large-scale migration; and this migration in turn exacerbated the socio-economic stresses that underpinned Syria's descent into war. This article provides a systematic interrogation of these claims, and finds little merit to them. Amongst other things it shows that there is no clear and reliable evidence that anthropogenic climate change was a factor in Syria's pre civil war drought; that this drought did not cause anywhere near the scale of migration that is often alleged; and that there exists no solid evidence that drought migration pressures in Syria contributed to civil war onset. The Syria case, the article finds, does not support 'threat multiplier' views of the impacts of climate change; to the contrary, we conclude, policymakers, commentators and scholars alike should exercise far greater caution when drawing such linkages or when securitising climate change. (C) 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.orgflicensesiby/4.0/)

Refugees and environmental changes in the international law

“…"Klimatski uslovi" u kontekstu pojave ozbiljnih suša, u sagledavanju činilaca koji uslovljavaju pojavu tražilaca azila u periodu od 2011. do 2015. godine, porede se sa oružanim konfliktima (Abel et al, 2019). S druge strane, u nekim analizama se ove veze relativizuju (Selby et al, 2017). Procenuje se da su gradovi posebno ugroženi kao destinacija migranata čiji se migracioni motivi vezuju za promene u životnoj sredini (Adamo, 2010).…”

Disasters in conflict areas: finding the politics

“…Similarly, in situations where rebel and non‐state groups are able to provide ‘resilience’ and ‘adaptation’ interventions to vulnerable populations, engaging with these armed actors is a valuable exercise that must be undertaken. Walch's evidence from the insurgencies in Philippines and Mali is useful in demonstrating that a distant and far‐off central state (Shah, ) holds little meaning for populations living in rebel‐controlled territories. If appropriate disaster preparedness and response measures have to be constructed and implemented in these areas, then sensible engagement with some type of non‐state actor is crucial.…”

“…The securitisation discourse on natural hazards-based disasters is not just welldeveloped and powerful, but is repeatedly encountered during disasters. Academic, journalistic, and policy reports have directly linked the Syrian drought to the start of the civil war in 2012 (Selby et al, 2017). Extreme weather events in Sub-Saharan Africa have long been presented as a security threat, resulting in the migration of 'violent' African men, within or without their national borders (Hartmann, 2014).…”

Allons-nous bientôt manquer d'eau ?

“…Mais la même chose peut se produire pour les conflits liés à l'eau, laquelle peut bien souvent être la cause première de la raréfaction des ressources alimentaires. Elle peut servir alors d'étincelle pour ranimer des conflits ancestraux liés à l'ethnie, au nomadisme, à la religion… Gleick (2014) attribue l'origine du conflit syrien à une forte sécheresse ayant entraîné une perte des productions agricoles et une migration des ruraux vers les centres urbains, d'où serait partie la révolte, mais ce point de vue est contesté par Selby et al (2017) et réaffirmé en réponse par Gleick (2017) ou d'autres commentateurs dans le même numéro de Political Geography. La f igure 11 selon Story (2015) donne les zones de conflits potentiels sur l'eau au XXI e siècle.…”